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ARTICLES 
THE UNEXAMINED LIFE: A FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS 
JUDICIAL BIAS IN CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 
AND BEYOND 
CLAIRE P. DONOHUE*  
ABSTRACT 
Scholars and litigators alike have long wondered about what is on the minds 
of judges. Kahan et al. have studied how judges’ political commitments influ-
ence their perception of legally consequential facts. Sheri Johnson et al. con-
firmed the presence of implicit bias among a sample of judges and analyzed the 
relationship between that bias and the judges’ decision-making. In a seminal pi-
ece and subsequent work, Guthrie et al. attempted to identify archetypes of judi-
cial bias and opined about how we might debias judicial determinations. This 
project both contributes to and redirects these conversations in several impor-
tant ways. First, the piece takes the conversation about judging into a court that 
daily touches the intimate affairs of litigants—namely family courts. In so 
doing, the project attempts to bring the same rigor of discussion about judicial 
bias, and imagination about corrective action, into one of the lower courts 
where litigants are routinely poor, disenfranchised, or unrepresented. Second, 
the project specifically sees connections between judicial bias and the orienta-
tion to fact finding that judges are invited to take—namely that the judge is the 
only fact finder (there are no juries) and judges are invited to place their own 
worldview and experiences at the epicenter of the scene playing out before 
them, an invitation that is inapposite to unbiased, rational consideration of the 
lives of others. In focusing specifically on how judicial bias thwarts expansive 
views of mothers and mothering in the twenty-first century, the piece aims to 
highlight the ways in which courts are in (imperfect and controlling) conversa-
tion with societal norms, norms that silence non-dominant narratives. Lastly, 
the project notices how the law’s circumscribed examination of litigants’ lives 
and the blindness to the ways that judges’ lives constrict their world views stand 
in marked contrast to the orientation of therapists, where controlling for one’s 
self and attention to a nuanced sense of other is the foundation from which 
therapists listen to, and learn about, people. Therefore, the project engages 
interdisciplinary scholarship not just to discuss what bias and stereotyping are, 
but also to excavate the ways in which the schooling and support in counseling 
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professions aim to abate the gravitational pull toward bias. From this scaffold-
ing, the piece closes with concrete, actionable steps for the bench and bar to 
resist bias and invite reform.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Paulette1 is a mother of two children and married to a white man ten years her 
senior. Paulette is the breadwinner in the family, though her unemployed hus-
band’s trust fund provides a certain scaffolding of comfort for the family. She is 
bright and determined. She emigrated to the United States from Uganda with her 
mother, in order to attend university, eventually completing her graduate studies 
in the States as well. She speaks eight languages and works in public health. 
1. Names and certain details of the litigants and their stories in relation to “Paulette” and “Norman” 
have been changed, and indication of the jurisdiction in which their cases was heard has intentionally 
been withheld to preserve client confidentiality. Both cases were adjudicated in the very recent past, but 
the dates too have been withheld. 
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Paulette took time off work when her second daughter was born; she struggled to 
find steady work to return to, because most of her employment was grant-based 
or on a contract basis. As the family began to stumble financially, other fault lines 
in the marriage emerged. Paulette and her husband began to argue constantly and 
bitterly. Paulette’s husband wanted her to leave the marital home. He filed for 
custody of their children—but not before filing for an Abuse Protection Order. 
Paulette glows when she describes her daughters. She speaks of their intelli-
gence, their talents, their humor, and their beauty. She holds her children in very 
high regard and has exacting expectations for their behavior. Her ex-husband is a 
doting and permissive parent with strong ties to a wealthy local family. A white 
female judge credited disputed testimony that Paulette had smacked her eleven- 
year-old’s mouth at the dinner table and deemed this an assault constituting an 
intrafamily offense. Without taking the matter under advisement, the judge 
placed an Abuse Protection Order against Paulette and imposed no-contact relief, 
barring Paulette from any physical contact with either of her children—not only 
her eleven-year-old, but also her two-year-old, regarding whom no allegations of 
any physical discipline had been made. 
Norman is a black man, a first-generation immigrant of Jamaican descent who 
is very bonded to his family. He had recently stepped down from full-time 
employment to care for an ailing parent, who then passed away. Norman and his 
ten-year-old daughter enjoy cooking together and visiting with his large extended 
family. Norman has bought his daughter a dog, and they have plans to launch her 
slime “business,” a business that, to his daughter’s delight, involves glue, glitter, 
and mess. Norman’s ex-wife is Latina. She is a loving mother who works full 
time and attends school at night. Most evenings, a maternal aunt collects 
Norman’s daughter from aftercare and brings her home for dinner and bed; her 
mother returns home after she is asleep. Norman and his then-wife were already 
behind on mortgage payments when, upon leaving the marital home, his wife 
ceased contributing to payments on it. Norman subsequently struggled to make 
payments on his salary alone, and the house fell into foreclosure. The marital 
home, where Norman currently still lives, is within walking distance of his 
daughter’s school, so Norman has been actively seeking apartments that will 
allow him to stay within a close distance of the school when the foreclosure goes 
through. 
Norman does not work full time. He works from 10 a.m. until approximately 
3 p.m. He does not want to change these hours, because he seeks a custody arrange-
ment whereby he would see his daughter every day before and after school while 
his ex-wife works, as well as every other weekend. After one day of testimony and 
without taking the matter under advisement, a white female judge adjusted the cus-
tody arrangement farther away from the 50/50 arrangement the couple was tempo-
rarily navigating and imposed an every-other-weekend custody schedule for 
Norman. She also ordered Norman to pay more child support to account for his 
having less custody of his child and for the childcare costs for before- and aftercare. 
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Stock-story narratives about the world thunder loudly in our subconscious, 
complete with scripts and schemas for human behavior. The persons and posi-
tions of these two litigants do not comport to stock stories of mothering, which 
likely caused a dissonance in the judges’ ears. One cannot help but notice how, 
and in whose favor, the judges resolved each dissonance.2 This phenomenon is 
not unique to the litigants above. When a speaker is one who is routinely silenced 
by society, or when the choices and preferences of the speaker fall outside that 
which is presubscribed by dominant society, there is a heightened risk that the lis-
tener fails to notice the unanticipated narrative, problematizes the “other,” or 
replaces the narrative with something less counter to his or her own assumptions.3 
The human tendency toward bias of this kind is particularly worrisome in the con-
text of courts, and particularly family courts, where the decisions of a few 
(judges) are governing the solution set for the diverse masses—and where the 
decisions of a single fact finder govern the nature and quality of the interaction 
between children and their caregivers. 
As a prophylactic against such bias, this Article embraces the notion that fact 
finders should examine their lives and the lives of those around them. 
Philosophers have argued that examining our lives is what separates us from 
beasts—a level of knowing, intentionality, and reflection is what makes us fully 
human.4 
See Julian Baggini, Wisdom’s Folly, THE GUARDIAN (May 12, 2005, 10:53 AM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/theguardian/2005/may/12/features11.g24; see also Lori Grueni, The Moral Status of 
Animals, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jul. 1, 2003), https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/fall2017/entries/moral-animal/ (discussing Kant and Korsgaard). 
Socrates even declared that the unexamined life was not worth living.5 
This insistence did not go well for Socrates: he stood trial for corruption of youth 
and was sentenced to death thereafter. Nonetheless, this Article adds that examin-
ing lives—ours and others’—is what helps us see and value the many and varied 
ways we all are human. In courtrooms, this is essential work: courtrooms are all 
about lives even as they are not about them at all. Litigants are forced to invite 
fact finders into their lives, but the consideration of those lives is narrow and cir-
cumscribed by the legal machine.6 The system pretends that litigants’ lives are 
the only lives at issue when, in reality, the narrative arcs of many lives are collid-
ing in courtrooms. The collision of judges’ and litigants’ lives is of particular 
2. When a person or scenario does not comport with a schema, we attribute it to something internally 
wrong with the person, not something wrong—or narrow or rigid—about our schema. See Sandra T. 
Azar & Corina L. Benjet, A Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicity, Race, and Termination of Parental 
Rights, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 251 (1994). 
3. Id. 
4.
5. Baggini, supra note 4. 
6. Let us return briefly to the philosophers to wonder with them whether “stories are recounted and 
not lived; life is lived and not recounted”—a premise that, if true, makes the work of litigating lives very 
complicated. See PAUL RICOEUR, ON PAUL RICOEUR: NARRATIVE AND INTERPRETATION 20 (David 
Wood ed., 2002); Thomas Gutheil et al., Preventing “Critogenic” Harms: Minimizing Emotional Injury 
From Civil Litigation, 28 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 11 (2000). 
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consequence for a litigant: if the litigant’s choices and preferences are dissimilar 
to the experiences of the judge, or counter to the dominant society’s stock stories, 
the courtroom is a breeding ground for bias.7 
This Article focuses on family court and custody proceedings to explore the 
fact finders’ very human tendency to favor people and narratives that seem famil-
iar and to fail to hear, disregard, or discredit those that do not. Thus, the Article 
starts with a premise that many in family law practice already know: judges’ rul-
ings often do not track with the enlarged potential of critical legal thinking but 
rather reflect narrow views of “mothering.”8 Moreover, notions of judicial neu-
trality create, or at least hide, all manner of sins when they convince fact finders 
that they are unbiased. Rather, “judges participate in the creation of meaning as 
well as in its discovery, and . . . our understanding of meaning may change.”9 
This Article will argue that several psychological principles relied on by those in 
counseling professions can inform efforts to mitigate the destructive subcon-
scious tendencies of fact finders, tendencies that, in family court, otherwise 
thwart efforts to expand how mothers and mothering are viewed in the twenty- 
first century.10 
The first two Sections situate family court judges in the jurisprudence of 
“mother” and “mothering,” which has typically ignored nuanced or broad notions 
of parenting generally and mothering specifically. Section One will begin with a 
thumbnail overview of the law surrounding and defining “mothers.” This brief 
discussion will focus on the “good mother” archetype in family law. While this 
section will highlight certain enlargements and advances in the jurisprudence of 
“mothering,” references to scholarship and current studies will demonstrate that 
family court judges still show remarkable intractability in their decision making. 
Section Two further problematizes the landscape by considering the subjective 
nature of the “Best Interest of the Child” (BIC) calculus for custodial 
7. See infra Section Three, Subsection A. Branding Mothers, for a discussion of prevailing stock 
stories of mothering; see also Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995) 
for a discussion of stereotypes and bias. 
8. Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interest of the Child Standard in 
American Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. FAM. STUD. 337, 337 (2008) (“The dearth of scholarship, however, on 
the foundations of this ‘best interests’ standard for children in American family law jurisprudence does 
not make the judge’s job any easier. The best interest standard necessarily invites the judge to rely on his 
or her own values and biases to decide the case in whatever way the judge thinks best. Even the most 
basic factors are left for the judge to figure out.” (citing MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 40 (2005)). 
9. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Wrestling with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 385 (1987) (further stating that the values expressed in the law are not 
culture free, and judicial interpretation of those laws is “rooted” in their own culture). 
10. The second reason for the family law context and mothering focus is to follow the ambition of 
Adrien Katherine King and Laura Weselmann, who, in 1999 “employ[ed] the critical race feminist 
notion of praxis to create goals [for how we view mothers and who we view as mothers] for the twenty- 
first century.” Adrien K. King & Laura Weselmann, Transcending Traditional Notions of Mothering: 
The Need for Critical Race Feminist Praxis, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 257, 258-59 (1999). 
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arrangements. A judge’s application of the BIC standard all too easily “rests on 
the judge’s personal observations and values.”11 In pondering the subjectivity and 
vulnerability of this standard, this section layers on what narrative theory—and 
life itself—tells us: stories are remembered and conflicts are understood based on 
what was heard, not merely on what was said. This section also begins to incor-
porate an interdisciplinary perspective by discussing what social psychologists 
call the “observer perspective,” or the divide between what is happening and 
what observers notice. This section argues that the issue is not necessarily the 
state of the law but rather how the facts of each case are credited and applied by 
the judge in each case. 
In hypothesizing about judges’ most likely observations and values around 
“mothers” and “mothering,” Section Three leaves the courtroom to consider 
what, beyond legal training or experience, might inform judges’ beliefs. Drawing 
upon contemporary and historical depictions of “mothering” in a social-cultural 
context, this section explores which stories of mothering resound, informing the 
stock stories of mothering and crowding out the less familiar narratives of some 
litigants. This section concludes by returning to Paulette’s and Norman’s cases 
to demonstrate how they align with the less visible or less favorable views of 
“mothering”—despite their acts and instincts of “mothering” being consistent 
with theories of positive and capable parenting. 
Section Four continues to layer on an interdisciplinary perspective by moving 
between therapists’12 couches and judges’ courtrooms in search of a solution to 
the judicial bias manifest in custody determinations. First, this section will 
describe therapists’ training and professional orientation, which promote their 
ability to listen properly and to investigate with curiosity and openness.13 It then 
juxtaposes therapists’ professional practice with the practices and procedures of 
the courtroom to highlight how difficult it is to control bias and infuse cultural 
humility into fact-finder decision making, particularly judges’ decision making. 
This section concludes with prescriptions for judicial training, rule reform, and 
litigation strategies that are inspired by therapists’ training and orientation to their 
work. Controlling for one’s self with attention to a nuanced sense of the other is 
the foundation from which therapists listen to, and learn about, people. This con-
trolled and careful listening is, in turn, the precursor to proposing any intervention 
in peoples’ lives. This all stands in stark contrast to a legal fact finder.14 Judges 
are not called upon to isolate and control for the ways in which their lived experi-
ences and assumptions affect what they hear; rather, fact finders are invited to 
11. See infra note 57. 
12. I am using the term “therapist” to refer generally to psychologists and social workers and those in 
emerging, similar fields. The piece may also refer to counseling or counselors in referencing these same 
individuals. 
13. Therapists continually revisit their training, often in conversation with one another, and surface 
occasions when any issues rear their head in working with clients. 
14. See also, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the 
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 889 (2012). 
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draw on their own “common sense and experience of life” when “deciding 
whether to believe a witness and how much importance to give a witness’s testi-
mony.”15 The recommendations in this section create opportunities for judges to 
slow down, to notice their biases and reactions, and to be as deliberate and 
thoughtful as possible before arbitrating litigants’ family lives. 
I. MOTHERS AND THE LAW: A THUMBNAIL SKETCH 
If one intends to critique fact finders about their application of fact to law, one 
must start with a brief description of that law. To understand the legal landscape 
of “mothering,” one must consider not just family court holdings but also cases 
that comment on men’s and women’s roles and functions in our society. Until 
very recently, and with few exceptions, the law endorsed the view that women 
ought to be mothers. 
A. WOMAN AS MOTHER 
The law assumes a default position for women as mothers. Let us begin 
nowhere near the beginning of the story but at a time where resistance and change 
were becoming quite visible: the late 1800s in the fight for women’s suffrage. 
During this time, a woman’s attempts to enter professional, public spheres were 
counter to her “paramount destiny and mission” to “fulfil the noble and benign 
offices of wife and mother.”16 In Bradwell v. Illinois, the Supreme Court affirmed 
15. See MASS. SUP. CT. CIV. PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.11.1(a) (revised 2018). Compare 
CRIM. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE IN THE DIST. CT. INSTRUCTION 2.260 (Admin. Office of the 
Dist. Ct., Commw. of Mass. 2009) (stating “it will be your duty to decide any disputed questions of fact. 
You will have to determine which witnesses to believe, and how much weight to give their testimony. 
You should give the testimony of each witness whatever degree of belief and importance that you judge 
it is fairly entitled to receive. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and if there are 
any conflicts in the testimony, it is your function to resolve those conflicts and to determine where the 
truth lies. . . In deciding whether to believe a witness and how much importance to give a witness’s 
testimony, you must look at all the evidence, drawing on your own common sense and experience of 
life.”) with CRIM. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE IN THE DIST. CT. INSTRUCTION 2.120 (Admin. 
Office of the Dist. Ct., Commw. of Mass. 2009) (stating “[y]our function as the jury is to determine the 
facts of this case. You alone determine what evidence you believe, how important any evidence is that 
you do believe, and what conclusions to draw from that evidence. In making these determinations, you 
are to use all of your common sense, life experience, and good judgment.”). 
16. In 1873, Ms. Myra Bradwell applied for admission to the Illinois Attorney’s Bar. Despite the 
efforts and inroads of suffrage, she was denied admission because she was a woman. See Bradwell v. 
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131 (1872). Ms. Bradwell insisted that under the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, a state may prescribe qualifications for 
applying for admission to a bar, but it may not exclude an entire class of citizens from the privilege of 
membership. Id. at 135. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of 
Illinois’ holding and adopted their mirage of legal neutrality, disposing of the case based on application 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 138. The Court held that the right to admission to practice 
in courts of a state is not one of the “privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United 
States” that a state is “forbidden to abridge.” Id. at 139. Justice Bradley, in his concurring opinion, was 
more inclined to call a gendered duck a duck in ratifying the state’s decision to exclude women from bar 
membership. See id. at 141-42. Bradley declared, “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to 
fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.” Id. 
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the Illinois Supreme Court’s denial of Ms. Myra Bradwell’s application to the 
Illinois Attorney Bar, on the basis of her being a married woman.17 What is strik-
ing in this case is that Myra Bradwell’s application for admission to the bar did 
not include reference to the fact that she was a married woman.18 This fact was 
read into her application by the Illinois Supreme Court.19 
Despite holding thusly, the lower court insisted that its decision was avoiding 
the question of whether it would “promote the proper administration of justice, 
and the general well-being of society” to license women as attorneys.20 Of course, 
in denying Bradwell’s application, the court was answering the question resound-
ingly in favor of the societal norms of woman’s connection to man through mar-
riage and her subservience to him and a family there.21 The outcome of the case 
thus reflected the Court’s deeply held assumptions about women: their singular 
purpose was to marry and tend to their Plural women vs singular husband. The 
law did not—and should not—recognize women as capable of holding professio-
nal roles in society.22 
In other legal discourse at this time, women’s “noble and benign” roles were 
juxtaposed against portrayals of women running alone and lustful in and out of 
marriages. Those resisting passage of the Married Women’s Property Act (1848), 
for example, insisted that laws ending coverture23 would result in women divorc-
ing their husbands or engaging in adultery.24 Women who had children out of 
wedlock at this time were deemed unfit parents, and they risked losing custody of 
their children to the state.25 The law expected women to be mothers, but it only 
recognized and protected their rights as mothers if they were married—kept and 
faithful. 
Despite the advocacy of the women’s suffrage movement to change societal 
views of womanhood and the ultimate wind-down of coverture in the early 
1900s, the all-male Court’s position remained that women would, naturally, 
17. Id. at 139. 
18. Id. at 131. After the lower court’s initial decision, Ms. Bradwell did confirm that she was married.  
19. “As a married woman . . . she would be bound neither by her express contracts nor by those 
implied contracts which it is the policy of the law to create between attorney and client.” Id. at 132-33 
(concurring opinion affirms the logic of assuming a woman will be married, stating that unmarried 
women are “exceptions to the general rule”). 
20. Id. at 132. The Illinois Superior Court reasoned that when the legislature conferred upon the court 
the right to grant law licenses, “it was not with the slightest expectation that this privilege would be 
extended to women.” Id. at 132-33. 
21. This assumed fact of marital status opened the door to the Court’s imagining and crediting the 
many problems that might flow from a scenario where a husband would not have supported his 
professional wife’s instinct in contracts, while forestalling their consideration of the many scenarios in 
which a woman would be free to operate effectively. Id. at 136-37 (citing her counsel’s argument). 
22. See id. at 141-42. 
23. Coverture was a legal doctrine under which a man and woman entering a marriage were merged 
and treated as one male-dominated legal entity. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) 
(citing BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 (1765)). 
24. NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER 
THE LAW 13-14 (2008). 
25. See, e.g., Moore v. Dozier, 57 S.E. 110 (1907). 
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obviously, primordially, be mothers. In a case concerning work-hour limits for 
women, for example, the Court reasoned that women’s bodies must be protected 
for the inevitable work of bearing children: “as healthy mothers are essential to 
rigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public 
interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”26 
The presumption that women would—and should—be mothers carried into 
laws concerning contraception, as did the continual concern for chastity.27 
See Maria T. Vullo, People v. Sanger and the Birth of Family Planning Clinics in America, 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF THE NEW YORK COURTS 43, 51 (2013), https://www.nycourts.gov/history/ 
programs-events/images/Judicial-Notice-09.pdf (citing, for example, Margaret Sanger’s appeal of her 
conviction under obscenity laws for disseminating information about birth control, which argued that 
birth control information was not indecent if it was “chaste, instructive, and creative.”). 
When 
women indicated they would rather not be mothers or sought to control the num-
ber and timing of children they had,28 
See Gloria Feldt, Margaret Sanger’s Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2006), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2006/10/15/opinion/nyregionopinions/15CIfeldt.html (“Sadie Sachs, a mother of three, 
had been warned that another pregnancy would kill her. When Sadie asked her doctor how to prevent 
pregnancy, he told her to tell her husband to sleep on the roof.”). 
the men writing the laws or presiding in the 
courts interpreting those laws insisted that contraception “turn[ed] loose” pas-
sions and led to “demoralization.”29 Public officials, predominantly male of 
course, declared women “selfish” in their campaign for control over reproduction, 
insisting that “[women] ought to devote more time to childbirth than equal 
suffrage.”30 
So strong was the presumption that women should be mothers that 1900s 
Comstock-era laws defined contraceptives as obscene and made it a federal 
offense to disseminate contraceptives over state lines or via the mail.31 The stories 
of the first women who resisted made headlines.32 
26. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). 
27.
28.
29. See Mary Alden Hopkins, Birth Control and Public Morals: An Interview with Anthony 
Comstock, HARPER’S WKLY. (May 22, 1945). See also Lawrence, supra note 9, at 385 (further stating 
that the values expressed in the law are not culture-free and judicial interpretation of those laws is 
“rooted” in their own culture). See Vullo, supra note 27, at 45 (“Comstock, [a U.S. postal inspector and 
politician] assembled a vice squad that assumed quasi-governmental functions, performing arrests and 
seizing evidence for use in criminal prosecutions, all in order to protect Comstock’s self-proclaimed 
code of morality. Contributions from wealthy New Yorkers—including mining millionaire William E. 
Dodge, Jr., financier J.P. Morgan and industrialist Samuel Colgate—funded Comstock’s salary and 
expenses”). 
30. See Vullo, supra note 27, at 48–49. 
31. An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of 
Immoral Use, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 599 (1873). 
32.
It would nonetheless remain 
illegal to discuss or distribute contraceptive devices or even educational material 
In 1916, Margaret Sanger, mother of the Planned Parenthood movement, was charged in a two- 
count indictment for “exhibiting and offering to sell ‘instruments, articles, recipes, drugs and medicines 
for the prevention of conception’ and ‘instruments of indecent and immoral use.’” Vullo, supra note 27, 
at 47. See also Information, People v. Sanger, No. 28, 735 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess. Nov. 13, 1916). In 1914, 
an arrest warrant had been issued for her. See Feldt, supra note 28. The charge was based on violations 
of the Comstock law. Id. The Comstock Act specifically defined contraceptives as obscene and then 
made it a federal offense to disseminate contraceptives over state lines or via the mails. See An Act for 
the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral Use, ch. 
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258, § 2. Ms. Sanger, a nurse, had been publishing a column called What Every Girl Should Know in The 
Call, a socialist newspaper. See Feldt, supra note 28. The column discussed sex education. Id. Anthony 
Comstock was so incensed that, as postal inspector, he banned the publication from the mail. Id. Ms. 
Sanger responded by publishing and disseminating a newsletter, The Woman Rebel, through the mail. Id. 
Ms. Sanger had previously fled to Europe to avoid the ensuing federal prosecution. Id. When she 
returned to the States, she opened a clinic in Brooklyn. The clinic was only open for ten days before she 
was arrested, tried, and ultimately found guilty. See Vullo, supra note 27, at 47–49. A woman who we 
would today call an activist, she was described at the time as being a “good-looking woman” and a 
“lawbreaker.” See id. at 49 (citing Disciples of Mrs. Sanger, Rich and Poor, Watch Trial, N.Y. TRIB. 
(Jan. 5, 1917), at 5). But see Mike Sosteric, Margaret Sanger’s Message to the Poor, SOCJOURN (Feb. 
28, 2018), https://www.sociology.org/who-was-margaret-sanger/ (citing criticism of Sanger that would 
resist labeling her as an activist who was concerned with the choices and autonomy of all women, and 
describing Sanger instead as a eugenicist who was seeking to control the population of a poor, “inferior” 
class). 
33. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND 
THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW FROM AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 360 (2017). 
34.
about family planning until the Contraception cases in the 1960s.33 And in 1965, 
the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut only invalidated prohibitions on dissemina-
tion of contraceptives to married people; it would be another decade before the 
Court refined its position to articulate that contraception concerned fundamen-
tally a woman’s right to be free of intrusion when deciding “whether to bear or 
beget a child.”34 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”); see also 
STONE, supra note 33, at 366. But even in Eisenstadt, the Court stopped short of deciding the case based 
on a due-process, liberty-interest analysis; rather, it decided the case on equal-protection grounds, 
finding that the Massachusetts contraception at issue simply did not serve an interest that legitimized 
treating married and unmarried persons differently. See 405 U.S. at 453. It is further worth noting that 
the right to decide whether to “bear or beget a child” remains attenuated for those who our sovereignty 
deems outsiders. See, e.g., Garza v. Hargan, 304 F. Supp. 3d 145 (2018). In 2017, the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR) which is responsible for the care, protection, and placement of unaccompanied 
migrant children, who are in federal custody due to their immigration status, issued instructions to its 
employees that limited their facilitating any abortion without direct approval and compliance with 
administrative hurdles. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(A); Garza, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 145. A class of Jane Does 
has been certified and there is a preliminary injunction in place, but the final analysis has yet to come. Id. 
And of course, countless states still have abortion restrictions that disproportionately affect the young 
and the poor. See Susan Milligan, A Guide to Abortion Laws by State, U.S. NEWS (July 27, 2019, 12:09 
PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2019-06-27/a-guide-to-abortion-laws-by-state. 
Despite the emerging notion that one might rather not “beget” a child, the 
notion of woman-as-mother remained an available default position for under-
standing women as an entire class of people. In Hoyt v. Florida, for example, the 
Supreme Court credited Florida’s policy of exempting women from juries as one 
promoting the “general welfare.”35 The Court reasoned the exemption would 
allow women uninterrupted repose at the “center of home and family life.”36 In 
contrast, there was no default exemption for men to be free and clear to be at the 
center of their home and family life.37 
35. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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The Hoyt court stopped short of declaring a 
woman’s place in the home as inevitable as the state of Florida had; it did, how-
ever, state that a woman had “her own special responsibilities” in the home.38 
Relatedly, the Social Security Act’s original provision for survivor’s benefits 
only extended to women, so that widows could remain home and care for their 
children (their default position); it did not anticipate that a man might have simi-
larly had his place at the home’s center.39 The provision reflected the reasoning of 
legislators from 1939, but it would remain in effect until 1975.40 Given the predi-
lection of legislatures and courts to favor, or at least anticipate, scenarios where 
women remained in the home to care for children, it is confusing to consider that 
a woman’s need for assistance in supporting them there has always been 
conditional. 
Until King v. Smith, states such as Alabama conditioned eligibility for Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, child-welfare benefits) on perceptions 
about the immorality of a mother cohabitating with a non-custodial person.41 To 
this day, states can—and many do—set eligibility requirements on Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), the program that replaced AFDC, that go 
beyond income eligibility calculations or design diversion programs to woo fami-
lies away from seeking the benefit.42 
See MEGAN THOMPSON ET AL., STATE TANF POLICIES: A GRAPHICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE 
TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY 2016 2 (May 2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/wrd_ 
2016_databook_companion_piece_05_15_18_508.pdf. 
Nonetheless, the prevailing position that women’s primary responsibilities 
were in the home had broader implications for women’s financial independence 
and supported the notion that men should earn more than women for work outside 
of the home.43 Until 1963, it was perfectly lawful for an employer to pay women 
less for doing the same jobs as men, and despite legal reforms,44 the gender wage 
gap stubbornly persists today with enormous discrepancies along gender and 
racial fault lines.45 
See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 7-9 (Fall 
2018), https://www.aauw.org/resources/research/simple-truth/ [hereinafter THE SIMPLE TRUTH]; 
see also POLIKOFF, supra note 24, at 15. 
For example, women of color are paid, on average, approxi-
mately 50% less than white men.46 White women are paid approximately 75%, 
and Asian women approximately 80%, compared to white men.47 These statistics 
perpetuate a self-fulfilling cycle that any family wishing to maximize their 
38. Id. 
39. The legislative history for the clause remained in effect until 1975, when the Supreme Court 
affirmed a New Jersey federal district court, holding that the provision unjustifiably discriminated 
against female workers. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 649 (1975); POLIKOFF, supra note 24, 
at 24. 
40. See 420 U.S. at 648–49. 
41. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320 (1968). 
42.
43. POLIKOFF, supra note 24, at 14-15. 
44. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-91). 
45.
46. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 45, at 7-9. 
47. Id. 
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bottom line would send the man, not the woman, into the workforce, reinforcing 
the default that makes men at home an uncommon phenomenon.48 
Of course, history is shaped differently for black and brown women, who suf-
fer most acutely under the wage gap despite having always been expected to 
work outside of the home and whose roles as mothers have been pathologized.49 
For black women, the roots of their default position as laborers date back to their 
bondage into slave labor.50 For Latinas, the sentiment may well trace to anti- 
immigrant rhetoric about Hispanic and Latino immigrants swarming the border.51 
Greg Grandin, The Border Patrol Has Been a Cult of Brutality Since 1924, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 
12, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/12/border-patrol-history/ (citing the “broad, 
generalized racism” against Mexicans in the 18th century that “concentrated along an ever-more focused 
line: the border” and is the origin story of brutal and dehumanizing practices such as the use of migrant 
children as “bait” and pushing “illegals off cliffs.”). See also Philip Bump, The Surge in Migrants 
Seeking Asylum, Explained, WASH POST (April 9, 2019, 12:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/2019/04/09/surge-migrants-seeking-asylum-explained/; Cedar Attanasio & Astrid Galvan, US 
Expands ‘Catch and Release’ Amid Surge in Migrants, ASSOCIATED PRESS (April 2, 2019), https:// 
apnews.com/ed3d75ce348d4be3bc7fdf02bc43e1d6. 
This trope is unfortunately a familiar one. Contemporary reports of the “surge” of 
immigrants from Central America were just as prevalent in the United States dur-
ing the 1920s, when the first limits in United States history were placed on the 
numbers of immigrants allowed in the country (1921) and when Congress passed 
legislation authorizing a “Border Patrol” (1924).52 
See Border Patrol History, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/ 
border-security/along-us-borders/history (last updated Oct. 5, 2018). 
As discussed in more detail 
below, the state was—and is—uninterested in shaping policies so that black and 
brown women could assist in preserving “the vigor and strength of the race.”53 
Indeed, despite the blanket assumption that a woman’s value was as bearer of 
children and keeper of the hearth, in the operation of family law, only a small 
slice of women, namely white, kept, manifestly chaste, heterosexual women, are 
empowered or credited as “good mothers.” In contrast, white fathers, black and 
brown mothers and fathers, and LGBTQ mothers and fathers are ignored, subor-
dinated, or vilified. 
B. FAMILY LAW’S “GOOD MOTHER” 
Family law jurisprudence tracked the principle message that women ought to 
be mothers, and, if they dared be other things as well, mothering would 
48. See id. 
49. See infra Section Three, Subsection B. Caustic Narratives and Missing Mothers. 
50. See Margaret Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, in FAMILY 
MATTERS: READINGS OF FAMILY LIVES AND THE LAW, 147, 151-53 (discussing the identity of slave 
women as property and laborer and the brutal consequences in the lived experience of slave women and 
also the lasting experience of black women and families at law: “[t]he needs of slavery have corroded 
both our legal legacy and our collective family experience. A careful analysis of the contribution of the 
slave experience to the current vicissitudes of the African-American family must take account of the 
failure of courts to exercise moral and legal authority and the consequent quasi-lawmaking role of 
the slavemaster.” Id. at 156). 
51.
52.
53. Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908); ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN 44 (1976). 
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nonetheless be their primary responsibility. Even though this notion is constrict-
ing for women, the default at least protected the interest of women if, and when, 
they did wish to mother. Troublingly, however, the protections of family law are 
best available for archetypal “good” mothers: white mothers, economically 
advantaged mothers, heterosexual mothers, and cis mothers. Non-conforming 
“mothers,” including fathers, continue to struggle for full recognition under the 
law as capable mothers. 
At its earliest inception, the laws of marriage and family gave the rights of 
organizing family affairs to the husband, including but not limited to earning 
power, owning property, and contracting.54 By extension, husbands had rights to 
the custody of the children in the event of separation, in order to secure for them-
selves the earning potential and labor of their children.55 But, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, men were leaving farms and farming for industry in city cen-
ters. As a consequence, there was less focus on retaining family laborers (chil-
dren) to work the land, and a new norm emerged: mother as caretaker and father 
as unfettered employee. The British Parliament codified this norm when it 
declared the Tender Years Doctrine, which presumed that mothers were the best 
custodians of children in their early years.56 The majority of states in the United 
States would soon follow suit.57 
The trend of mothers securing custody over their children in the event of mari-
tal separation was abated somewhat by the still-prevailing sense that it was ruin-
ous for women to look outside of marriage or choose for herself to exit marriage. 
In the early 1900s in Maryland family court, for example, the court could retain 
jurisdiction over a child and grant custody to the child’s father in cases of adultery 
by the mother.58 Moreover, a woman failing to follow her husband should he 
decide to move, could be construed as her deserting him and therefore the basis 
for a divorce deemed her fault.59 Nonetheless, as the cultural revolution of the 
1960s normalized divorce, ushering in the transition to “no fault” divorces, there 
was renewed interest in deciding which parent is best situated to care for chil-
dren.60 A powerful wave of feminism helped here.61 Feminists were outspoken in 
naming the privilege and subordination of varying public and private roles (e.g. 
privileged public role of man as employee versus subordinated private role of  
54. Originally, the father was the custodian because children were property. POLIKOFF, supra note 24, 
at 12. 
55. Id. 
56. See Martha J. Bailey, England’s First Custody of Infants Act, 20 QUEEN’S L.J. 391, 410 (1995) 
(discussing the history and passage of the Custody of Infants Act of 1839). 
57. Kohm, supra note 8, at 367. 
58. Pangle v. Pangle, 134 Md. 166, 170 (1919). 
59. POLIKOFF, supra note 24, at 14. 
60. Id. at 22. But see ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF WOMEN 
WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE V. WADE 112–13 (2006). 
61. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 17-32 (3d ed. 2013). 
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woman as caretaker).62 They mounted a resistance to the subordination of private 
roles and to a woman’s default position in them, while also articulating that any 
one woman’s desires may change or that hers may differ from another woman’s, 
such that women should be empowered to move between roles.63 
In response, courts began moving away from the gendered assumptions under-
lying the Tender Years Doctrine by stepping down consideration of tender years 
to that of a presumption or absorbing it into the more elusive “Best Interest of the 
Child” (BIC) calculus.64 The BIC standard requires balancing the abilities and 
constraints of each potential custodian against the needs of the child and the con-
text of the family to determine how best to meet the needs of the child within the 
context of her or his family. In some jurisdictions, BIC statutes propose consider-
ation of certain factors, such as: the wishes of the child, the wishes of the parent, 
the child’s and parents’ mental and physical health, and the child’s adjustment 
and connection to school, home, and community.65 In other jurisdictions, the 
62. Catharine MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in THE MORAL 
FOUNDATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 144, 148 (Robert K. Fullinwinder & Claudia Mills eds., 1986). 
63. Id. at 149-50; MARTHA CHAMALLAS, ASPEN TREATISE FOR INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY (2012) (stating that feminists debated how women’s “different voice”—with its concern for 
human relationships and for the positive values of caring, nurturing, empathy, and connection—could 
find greater expression in law.”). 
64. Angela Marie Caulley, Equal Isn’t Always Equitable: Reforming the Use of Joint Custody 
Presumptions in Judicial Child Custody Determinations, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403 (2018); see, e.g., 
Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 368 A.2d 635, 639-40 (Pa. 1977) (“We also question the 
legitimacy of a doctrine that is predicated upon traditional or stereotypic roles of men and women in a 
marital union. Whether the tender years doctrine is employed to create a presumption which requires the 
male parent to overcome its effect by presenting compelling contrary evidence of a particular nature; or 
merely as a makeshift where the scales are relatively balanced; such a view is offensive to the concept of 
the equality of the sexes which we have embraced as a constitutional principle within this jurisdiction.” 
(citations omitted)); Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (“Unconstitutional gender-based 
classification discriminating between men and women”). It is worth noting, however, that the Tender 
Years Doctrine is by no means an extinct doctrine, and indeed it rears its head to support shocking 
conclusions. See e.g., Mercier v. Mercier, 717 So. 2d 304, 307 (Miss. 1998) (“[A] child is no longer of 
tender years when that child can be equally cared for by persons other than the mother.”); see also 
Gilliland v. Gilliland, 969 So. 2d 56, 66-67 (Miss. 2007). In 1979, California passed the first joint 
custody statute, articulating the option of shared custodial arrangements. See Caulley, id. Less than 
twenty years later, forty of the states had joint custody statutes that declared joint custody an option, if 
not a preference. Id. 
65. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914 (West 2003). In determining the care and custody of a child, 
the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration. To determine the best interest of the 
child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: 
(A) the wishes of the child as to his or her custodian, where practicable; 
(B) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to the child’s custody; 
(C) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents, his or her 
siblings, and any other person who may emotionally or psychologically affect the child’s best 
interest; 
(D) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community; 
(E) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; 
(F) evidence of an intrafamily offense as defined in section 16-1001(5) [now § 16-1001(8)]; 
(G) the capacity of the parents to communicate and reach shared decisions affecting the child’s 
welfare; 
(H) the willingness of the parents to share custody; 
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standard is stated more generically as a totality of the circumstances test.66 As is 
the case with any balancing test, the BIC standard is indeterminate and ripe for 
insertion of subjective opinions.67 
Despite the bias vulnerabilities of the BIC calculus, there is evidence of pro-
gress toward a more inclusive and progressive view of motherhood, and parent-
hood more broadly, stemming from the recent legalization of same-sex marriage, 
the widespread adoption of “no-fault” divorce laws, and the embrace of social 
science literature into family court deliberations. As a result, social realities con-
cerning whether couples with children marry, or remain couples at all, mean cus-
tody disputes are playing out in increasingly varied family constellations.68 
Between 2005 and 2015, the rate of marriage declined while cohabitation rates increased. See 
LYDIA ANDERSON, SOCIAL, ECON. & HOUSING STATISTIC DIV., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FAMILY AND 
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION: VARIABILITY BY ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN 
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS (2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/ 
working-papers/2018/demo/SEHSD-WP2018-10.pdf. A recent study showed that half of people ages 
26-31 are having their children outside of marriage. See Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Why Are So Many 
Millennials Having Children Out of Wedlock?, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 18, 2016), https://www.theatlantic. 
com/business/archive/2016/07/why-are-so-many-millennials-having-children-out-of-wedlock/491753/ 
(discussing Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Changing Fertility Regimes and the Transition to Adulthood: 
Evidence from a Recent Cohort (unpublished thesis, Johns Hopkins University) (on file with the Johns 
Hopkins University Library system)). Surveys suggest that in 2017, approximately 40 percent of births 
across the U.S. were to single women. See JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONT. & 
PREVENTION, BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2017 (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/ 
nvsr67/nvsr67_08-508.pdf. Lastly, there are more single white mothers than black mothers. See 
DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 63 (2002). 
Such 
developments provide some hope that the BIC standard can accommodate a 
wider view of who can “mother” and what it means to “mother.” 
From Loving v. Virginia to Obergefell v. Hodges, high-profile cases securing 
the rights of diverse populations to marry have also introduced judicial eyes to 
varied primary caregiving arrangements for children.69 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state prohibitions against inter-race 
marriages); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (invalidating state prohibitions against 
Justice Kennedy’s 
(I) the prior involvement of each parent in the child’s life; 
(J) the potential disruption of the child’s social and school life; 
(K) the geographic proximity of the parental homes as this relates to the practical considerations of 
the child’s residential schedule; 
(L) the demands of parental employment; 
(M) the age and number of children; 
(N) the sincerity of each parent’s request; 
(O) the parent’s ability to financially support a joint custody arrangement; 
(P) the impact on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or Program on Work, Employment, 
and Responsibilities, and medical assistance; and 
(Q) the benefit to the parents. 
Id. 
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208 § 31 (1975) (“In making an order or judgment relative to the custody 
of children, the rights of the parents shall, in the absence of misconduct, be held to be equal, and the 
happiness and welfare of the children shall determine their custody. When considering the happiness 
and welfare of the child, the court shall consider whether or not the child’s present or past living 
conditions adversely affect his physical, mental, moral or emotional health.”). 
67. Kohm, supra note 8, at 373. 
68.
69.
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same-sex marriage). See also BRITTANY RICO ET AL., SOCIAL, ECON. & STATISTICS DIV., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, EXAMINING CHANGE IN THE PERCENT OF MARRIED-COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS THAT ARE 
INTERRACIAL AND INTERETHNIC: 2000 TO 2012-2016 (2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/ 
Census/library/working-papers/2018/demo/SEHSD-WP2018-11.pdf. 
opinion in Obergefell and his subsequent discussions revealed that the outcome 
was in part motivated by attention to children of same-sex couples and their rela-
tionship with their parents, even while the holding itself stood for the fundamen-
tal right of two adults to marry.70 
See 135 S. Ct at 2590 (stating that “the marriage laws at issue thus harm and humiliate the 
children of same-sex couples”); Bill Browning, Anthony Kennedy Says He ‘Struggled’ with Marriage 
Equality Ruling, LGBTQ NATION (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2018/11/anthony- 
kennedy-says-struggled-marriage-equality-ruling/ (“As we thought about this and I thought about it 
more and more, it just seemed to me, you know, wrong under the Constitution to say that over 100,000 
adopted children of gay parents couldn’t have their parents married. I just thought that this was 
wrong.”). 
Kennedy reasoned beyond his privately held 
beliefs opposing same-sex marriage and toward a more inclusive posture.71 He 
based this departure on his sincere belief that the children of same-sex families 
should not be made to feel as “others,” or less than the children of straight, mar-
ried parents. This perspective opened the door to understanding that a paradigm 
that makes children feel that way is not just unkind, but also unwarranted under 
the law.72 
As previously noted, for families wishing to end their marriages, a majority of 
states have abandoned the fault requirement for divorce, recognizing a “no fault” 
basis, which then tamped down rhetoric of “fault” in custody determinations.73 
Parents no longer need to vilify one another through use of tropes—such as a 
cheating wife or deadbeat father, and instead, divorce proceedings can focus on 
shoring up both parents’ personhood and commitment as parents.74 Lastly, legis-
lation in the care and neglect realm, which has long had a trickle-down effect into 
family law, has begun to cite and credit social science literature calling for priori-
tizing reunification of families and a more careful, accepting consideration of cul-
tural differences in parenting.75 
Despite these improvements in the law, the opinions regarding best interest of 
the child unavoidably were—and still are—mirrors for a judge’s opinions about 
the parent.76 While it is logical to some degree for a judge to consider the fitness 
of a parent when considering how best a child can be nurtured and supported, the 




73. Of course, this is not to say vitriol will not still be present. See POLIKOFF, supra note 24, at 32. 
74. Id. 
75. Judith C. Scott & Jessica A. K. Matthews, Youth of Color in Care: Intersecting Identities and 
Vulnerabilities, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND PREJUDICE 353-73 (Hiram E. Fitzgerald et al., eds., 
2019). 
76. Id. (discussing book that revolutionized the best interest of the child standard). But see POLIKOFF, 
supra note 24, at 32 (discussing how even as fault divorces are receding, there can be consideration of 
fault in a custody dispute, provided the “fault” at issue has affected the child). 
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“good mother.”77 The “good mother” standard risks riding the tidal wave of 
American jurisprudence regarding biased notions of motherhood, notably: wom-
en’s “paramount destiny” and “special responsibilities” as mothers; racialized 
and heteronormative notions of mothers; and silence as to fathers’ possible—let 
alone competent and nurturing—place at the “center of home and family life.”78 
In 1999, family law scholars Adrien Katherine King and Laura Weselmann 
employed critical feminist and race theory to create goals for transcending tradi-
tional notions of mothering.79 Sitting at the intersection of scholarship and prac-
tice, and reflecting on cases litigated in 2017, this Article asks: have we 
succeeded? And if not, why not? 
II. BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD AND JUDGE’S PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS: AN 
OBVIOUS AND INTRACTABLE PROBLEM 
Nothing in the BIC standard explicitly precluded Norman, for example, from 
working “mommy hours” and providing stay-at-home care for his child. 
Similarly, the law no longer explicitly denies Paulette the opportunity to be her 
multiplicitous self: a mother who is the primary breadwinner, the more authoritar-
ian disciplinarian compared to her male spouse, and someone committed to, and 
capable of, nurturing her children. Yet, despite the best efforts of advocates to 
change legal standards and shift cultural views of motherhood, or parenthood 
more broadly, the trajectory and the lack of inclusivity in the jurisprudence of 
“mothering” persists and remains foreboding for “mothers” like Paulette and 
Norman. Indeed, despite evolving views in contemporary culture and within the 
academic community, other judicial decisions reminiscent of the limited view of 
who ought to “mother” and how “mothering” can be done persist. This Article 
argues that the issue is not necessarily the state of the law, but rather, how the 
facts of each case are credited and applied by the judge in each case.80 
Family law practitioners and scholars have noted that “[t]he greatest concern 
with the use of BIC today is that application of the doctrine rests on the judge’s 
personal observations and values.”81 Where a judge relies on extrajudicial perso-
nal knowledge of a litigant or an event to support a conclusion of law, there is a 
77. Caulley, supra note 64, at 405. 
78. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42; Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62. 
79. King & Weselmann, supra note 10, at 258-59. 
80. Derrick Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 901 (“The 
problem is that not all positioned perspectives are equally valued, equally heard, or equally included. 
From the perspective of critical race theory, some positions have historically been oppressed, distorted, 
ignored, silenced, destroyed, appropriated, commodified, and marginalized—and all of this, not 
accidentally”). For many, particularly those with subordinated identities, rights are unstable and 
indeterminate. See generally Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363–64 (1984); 
see also Lawrence, supra note 9, at 385 (further stating that the values expressed in the law are not 
culture free and judicial interpretation of those laws is “rooted” in their own culture). 
81. Kohm, supra note 8, at 353. See also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the “best interests of the child standard offers little guidance to 
judges, and may effectively encourage them to rely on their own personal values.”). 
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case for reversal.82 However, the situation is much murkier when one considers 
instances where a judge’s extrajudicial life experiences create blind spots for 
some facts, hypervigilance around others, and dictate a rigid set of meanings and 
values for given observations. Thus, it would be fair to say here, in the context of 
family court, that: 
In effect the trial judge, as a basis for [his] findings, made of himself a 
witness, and in making [these findings] availed himself of his personal 
knowledge; he became an unsworn witness to material facts without 
the [parties] having any opportunity to cross-examine, to offer coun-
tervailing evidence or to know upon what evidence the decision would 
be made.83 
In some respects, judges resolving issues of BIC according to their general, 
personal observations and values is more problematic than a judge relying on 
specific, extrajudicial personal knowledge of a litigant or an event.84 A pre-
sumption of judicial neutrality is at the core of our judicial system.85 However, 
latent bias—such as racism or sexism—may well be undetectable not only to 
the judge herself, but also the litigants before her.86 
Further, where a judge imports values and biased perspectives, the risk is both 
more subtle and more consequential in the aftermath. A judge importing facts 
should at least catalogue the importation into the finding of fact,87 unlike importa-
tion of values, which may be unconscious. If found to be present, the effect of a 
judge importing such personal bias is highly consequential. Determining whether 
a judge has imported personal observations and values requires looking beneath 
82. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Szentes, 33 A.2d 124 (1943); Siebert v. Siebert, 200 A.2d 258 (1964). 
83. Kohm, supra note 8, at 353 (citing Kovacs, 33 A.2d at 126). 
84. Papa v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 444 A.2d 196 (1982) (determining that trial court’s 
findings were “not based on any evidence, are obviously improper” and were based on the judges’ 
personal knowledge and a level of being “personally involved. . . thus, in effect, becoming an unsworn 
witness, without allowing the defendants any opportunity to cross-examine or to offer countervailing 
evidence.”). 
85. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Neutrality and Judicial Review, 22 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 217 
(2003). 
86. Lawrence, supra note 9, at 322 (“Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions 
about racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional 
—in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought—nor unintentional—in the sense that 
the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker’s beliefs, desires, and 
wishes. Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still 
plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, 
and beliefs that attach significance to an individual’s race and induce negative feelings and opinions 
about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. 
At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways in which our 
cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect 
our actions.”); see also, e.g., Browning, supra note 70 (“The nature of injustice is that you can’t see it in 
your time.”). 
87. Papa, 444 A.2d at 209 (where no evidence of an interview was introduced at trial, yet in the 
court’s findings of fact there were four pages of findings concerning the interview). 
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and between the articulated findings.88 One must consider what facts are missing 
or present in the findings of facts and what facts are or are not credited; from 
here, one must analyze whether there is any pattern of disdain or disregard in the 
ignored and discredited facts or any pattern of biased positive regard in the facts 
the judge does cite and credit.89 Lastly, even if the threat of latent bias were 
known and articulable ahead of time, there are no procedural safeguards against 
the threat that are akin to a motion for recusal in an instance of judicial impartial-
ity.90 While the prejudiced attention to facts and the cloistered reasoning about 
those facts is influential on the judge’s ruling, these determinations are nearly 
immune from review in the context of family law where the standards for permis-
sible consideration of race and gender are still unclear.91 Put plainly, barring bla-
tant, explicitly impermissible consideration of a litigant’s identity, it is difficult to 
pierce the holding. 
This means that judges have to “get it.” If judges are going to promote an ex-
pansive and inclusive trajectory of mothering, they must make nuanced and 
informed applications of fact to law. In order to apply facts to law, the fact finder 
has to hear the facts and credit them. But fact finders, like all people, have sub-
conscious tendencies to favor litigants and narratives that seem familiar. 
Narrative scholars have long since noted that sitting on the other side of a  
88. See Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2002). 
89. Id. Consider, for example, certain findings of facts and credibility determinations in the case of 
Paulette: Paulette’s husband describes her as being 5’8 but subsequent evidence confirmed that she was 
barely 5’1 tall. See Transcript of Record, Day 2, p.109 (confidential source on file with author). The 
evidence of their relative size was arguably probative of the issue of who was a primary aggressor in an 
altercation. In her findings, the judge stated, “I think he misspoke or was confused, but it was not an 
intentional attempt to deceive.” Id. In the same proceedings, Paulette’s husband, the petitioner, had 
testified that she bodily intimidated him. On cross, he testified to being 6’0 and about 200 pounds. Id. It 
was subsequently established that Paulette is 5’1, and indeed notably petite, both short and lightweight. 
Id. During her findings on credibility, the judge shored up the petitioner’s credibility by saying, “The 
only problem I had with Mr. Mahoney’s testimony was when he described his wife as being 5’8, and she 
is only 5’1, and I think he misspoke or was confused, but it was not an intentional attempt to deceive.” 
Id. Later, the judge had an opportunity to consider if Paulette’s use of measurement was accurate or 
inaccurate and whether any inaccuracy was a mistake or confusion and not an attempt to deceive. Id. 
One sees that the judge did not resolve any ambiguity in Paulette’s favor. Id. Here, Paulette had testified 
that she would often use a technique of clapping her hands loudly three or four times and then saying, 
“come on, come one,” when she was urging the children to get ready to leave the house for school. Id. 
She acknowledged raising her voice on these occasions and acting impatiently. Id. Recalling this 
information, the judge said, “Your testimony about how you would clap your hands together to get her 
to comply. . .when you say you never clapped your hands when you were closer than twenty feet away, I 
think that’s just so unbelievable. . .parents often clap their hands and they’re not twenty feet away. . .I 
think it was your way of distancing yourself from what you were doing.” Id. The author’s own analysis 
of this distinction is based on subtleties and subjective opinion. One wonders, even where the author can 
find other, similar patterns, whether they would be sufficient to prove impartiality. 
90. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1990). 
91. See Kohm, supra note 8, at 346 (discussing the abolished tender years doctrine and the legacy of 
gender in a best interest analysis); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test 
and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 61–62 (1991) (explaining that it still unclear how race 
factors into custody modifications). 
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presentation is an audience, and audiences are “unequivocally contextualized.”92 
An audience’s interpretation will not always coincide with what the author 
intended if the audience does not have the knowledge or experience that the 
author is relying on.93 In these cases, the audience not only misses content, but 
more fundamentally does not “come to an adequate understanding of” the norms 
the author was relying on or attempting to communicate.94 In other words and for 
our purposes: a judge’s ruling does not follow what was said but instead reflects 
back what was heard. These are distinct. 
Narrative scholars are not alone in considering the divide between what is hap-
pening (or intended by an author) and what is noticed by an observer (or audi-
ence). Social psychologists point out that when observers look at people and try 
to make sense of their behavior, “the actor dominates [the observer’s] literal and 
mental visual field, which makes the circumstances [the actor is responding to] 
less visible.”95 
Consider, for example, the protests following recent police shootings of 
unarmed black Americans. Whether one chooses to call the aftermath a “protest” 
or a “riot” may well turn on the force an “observer perspective” has in view.96 
Actions such as property damage, gun fire, and shouting may dominate one’s vis-
ual field. A mental view of fire and damage might lead one to conclude that this is 
a riot. Searching for a cause of a riot, one might conclude it is due to lawlessness 
and aggression. Because our analysis flows from the initial visual field, it deem-
phasizes other causes of the behavior and other ways to understand what we are 
seeing, “namely[,] the circumstances to which [the actor] is adapting.”97 
Taking a wider view to consider unseen circumstances at play in the lives of 
the black protesters, one sees rampant systemic injustice: wage gaps, dispropor-
tionate mortality rates, educational disparities, a skewed and brutalizing criminal 
justice system, and the attendant anger, yes, but also fatigue, grief, and righteous 
92. Dan Shen, Implied Author, Authorial Audience, and Context: Form and History in Neo- 
Aristotelian Rhetorical Theory, 21 NARRATIVE 140, 151 (2013). 
93. “[T]he author of a novel designs his work rhetorically for a specific hypothetical audience. Like a 
philosopher, historian, or journalist, he cannot write without making certain assumptions about his 
readers’ beliefs, knowledge, and familiarity with conventions. His artistic choices are based upon these 
assumptions, conscious or unconscious, and to a certain extent, his artistic success will depend on their 
accuracy.” See Peter J. Rabinowitz, Truth in Fiction: A Reexamination of Audiences, 4 CRITICAL 
INQUIRY 121, 126 (1977). Perhaps this is why narrative is imported into trial advocacy with a focus on 
case theory and appeal to the audience, the trier of fact. See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: 
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 487 (1994) (“Case theory—or 
theory of the case—can be seen as an explanatory statement linking the ‘case’ to the client’s experience 
of the world. It serves as a lens for shaping reality, in light of the law, to explain the facts, relationships, 
and circumstances of the client and other parties in the way that can best achieve the client’s goals. The 
relevant reality combines the perspectives of the lawyer and the client with an eye toward the ultimate 
audience—the trier of fact.”) (emphasis added). 
94. Shen, supra note 92, at 153. 
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indignation.98 
William J. Barber, II, Editorial: Charlotte is Drowning in Systematic Injustice, NBC NEWS (Sep. 
22, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/editorial-charlotte-drowning-systematic-injustice- 
n652541?fbclid=IwAR1Y9s6nno2iYxTiGZK5YR1bgkQIrYbiaVNNqyxbbF_ceRIOftvV5KsH5JY. 
Within this framing, the behavior itself looks different.99 Observers 
looking at a person or group will “tend to stress internal, dispositional causes of 
their behavior,” whereas observers who are able to take the perspective of the 
actor and reckon with the circumstances the actors face will “stress more situa-
tional causes.”100 And here’s the rub: just as an observer who is unfamiliar with 
the narratives and experiences of a black protester may struggle to connect with 
the identity and circumstances of that person, so too might a judge unfamiliar 
with “mothers” who defy race, gender, and heteronormative norms be unable to 
make fair sense of their behavior. 
So how familiar are Norman’s and Paulette’s stories to those anointed by a 
system—the legal system—that favors the dominant society’s view of reality? 
This next section considers the prevailing notions of mothering in our contempo-
rary culture outside the courtroom such that we can then consider its influence on 
judges’ perspective as observers in the courtroom. 
III. THE VISUAL FIELD OF “MOTHER” 
Judges, just like the rest of us, are steeped in society’s expressions of mother-
ing and normative claims about mothering. “Mothering,” or at least certain ver-
sions of it, are evident in our books, media, advertising, and other prevalent 
mediums helping to shape our culture. Early understandings of “mothers” and 
“mothering” are often formed by those first moments with children’s books.101 
Mothering is in the news and on the movie screens.102 
See, e.g., Joelle Goldstein, Mother Admits She Once Judged Stay-at-Home Moms—But 
Tearfully Reveals, ’I Get It Now’, YAHOO (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/ 
mother-admits-she-once-judged-210143746.html; Hayley Wielgus, Remarkable Women: Manchester 
Mother’s Mission to Raise Awareness for Son’s Rare Disorder, WKRN (last updated Feb 13, 2020), 
https://www.wkrn.com/community/remarkable-women/remarkable-women-manchester-mothers-mission- 
Mothering is alive in one’s 
98.
99. As one commentator put it: “I am a pastor. I will not condemn grief. But I was trained as a 
lifeguard, and I learned a long time ago that when people are drowning, their instincts can kill them and 
anyone who tries to help them. If a lifeguard can get to a drowning person, the first thing the lifeguard 
says is, “Stop struggling. Let me hold you up in this water, and we can get to the shore together. The 
riots in Charlotte are the predictable response of human beings who are drowning in systemic injustice. 
We must all pray that no one else gets hurt. But we must understand why this is happening.” Id. The 
ability to understand the experience of another is known as empathy. Research has identified four 
components or areas of empathy: first, emotional empathy, which involves sharing the feelings of 
another; then cognitive empathy, which speaks to the ability to comprehend the feelings of the other; 
third is moral empathy which refers to the motivation to understand and relate to the other; lastly, there 
is behavioral empathy which involves being able to communicate your understanding of the other. See 
Jane Stein-Parbury, PATIENT AND PERSON: INTERPERSONAL SKILLS IN NURSING 146 (5th ed. 2014). 
100. Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 627 (1997); E. E. Jones & R. 
E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior, in 
ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 79–94 (E. E. Jones et al., eds., 1972). This is also 
the key to empathy. See CARL R. ROGERS, A WAY OF BEING 140 (1980). 
101. David A. Anderson & Mykol Hamilton, Gender Role Stereotyping of Parents in Children’s 
Picture Books: The Invisible Father, 52 SEX ROLES 145, 145 (2005). 
102.
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to-raise-awareness-for-sons-rare-disorder/; Lena Wilson, When Moms Attack, NY TIMES (Feb. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/12/movies/the-lodge-bad-mothers.html. 
103. “The 1950s model of a two-parent household in which only one parent worked outside the home 
has long faded into obscurity. Today a child raised in such a household is in a distinct minority. In 
March 2002, only 23.7% of all children in the United States lived with two parents and had only one 
parent in the labor force.” Martin H. Malin & Monica Biernat, Do Cognitive Biases Infect Adjudication? 
A Study of Labor Arbitrators, 11 U. PA J. BUS. L. 175, 190 (2008); see also Sean G. Massey et al., 
Modern Prejudice and Same-Sex Parenting: Shifting Judgments in Positive and Negative Parenting 
Situations, 9 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 129, 130 (2013) (“The number of same-sex headed households in the 
United States has grown steadily over the past 20 years. The 2010 U.S. Census puts the number of same- 
sex couples who are living together at 646,464 (131,729 same-sex married couple households and 
514,735 same-sex unmarried couple households).”); Bartlett, infra note 114, at 884. 
104. Caulley, supra note 64, at 416. 
105. Id. at 417. 
106. Id. at 418. 
107. Andrea L. Miller, Expertise Fails to Attenuate Gendered Biases in Judicial Decision-Making, 
10 SOC. PSYCHOL. AND PERSONALITY SCI. 227, 231 (2019). 
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own lived experiences of being a child and possibly a parent. Judges, therefore, 
do not preside over a custody matter in a vacuum; they sit in the white noise of 
their lived experiences and societal messaging—while often being unaware of all 
that they have not lived or seen or known. It is worth taking a moment, therefore, 
to consider what judges who are raised and socialized by dominant culture would 
readily see in terms of “mother” and “mothering,” and what may very well be 
lost to them. 
A. BRANDING THE “GOOD MOTHER” 
According to statistical studies, we have made steady progress away from an 
antiquated ideal of a two- (hetero) parent household in which mom stays at home 
and dad provides financial support for the family.103 This is not to say, however, 
that men and women entering the workforce, or entering relationships in different 
combinations and with varying frequency, has opened the door to a revolution in 
terms of who can mother and what mothering looks like. Consider that many 
courts use a primary caregiver heuristic in their BIC calculus, which, while “gen-
der neutral [on its face]. . . essentially serves as a proxy for motherhood since 
most primary caregivers are women.”104 California, for example, was the first 
state to pass a joint-custody statute in 1979; yet a 1990s study showed that 70% 
of California custody awards were made to mothers.105 In another study, research-
ers found that the majority of judges in Indiana still used the abolished Tender 
Years Doctrine, and, where the doctrine was employed, mothers were awarded 
custody 91.7% of the time.106 As recently as 2019, a study concluded that judges 
awarded mothers half (.5) a day more time on average than they awarded fathers, 
a decision that would, over the course of a year, give the mother about a month 
more custodial time than the father. Using the same fact patterns, lay subjects 
only awarded mothers .15 more days.107 
Common perceptions of “mothers” and “mothering” remain captive to how 
they are depicted and portrayed by the media. The campaign to name and frame 
“good mothers” began in the 1980s in an effort to “re-domesticate” the mother af-
ter the waves of feminism had encouraged record numbers of women to the 
shores of higher education and the workplace.108 As one author put it: 
Women demanded equal access to employment and pay, divorce had 
lost its stigma, and the cult of motherhood and domestic bliss had 
begun to lose its sheen. By the 1980s, however, with Ronald Reagan in 
the office and evangelical Christianity at the height of its political 
influence, conservatives were mounting efforts to roll back these 
changes and shore up the old domestic order.109 
Moreover, a dramatic increase in books on mothering invited women to con-
sider that returning to domestic life would be to return to an “unselfish, loving” 
space free of “consumerist mentalities.”110 Between 1970 and 1980, only twenty- 
seven books were published on mothering; yet between 1980 and 2000, 773 
books were published, an average of 386 books a year.111 These books and count-
less other campaigns and marketing strategies set about constructing a new 
“momism” by advising, flattering, warning, and selling things to women.112 
Id. at 8, 240–42; Claire Cain Miller, The Relentlessness of Modern Parenting, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/upshot/the-relentlessness-of-modern-parenting.html. 
At 
the same time, if wooing mothers softly and incessantly did not work, then scar-
ing them might. There was also a boom in prosecutions of daycare providers, 
many of which “drew on long-standing [utterly uninformed] anxieties about 
homosexuals’ [allegedly having] a predisposition to pedophilia.”113 
BECK, supra note 109, at xxiv, 139; see also Bernard Baran, Mass Exoneration (Nov. 18, 2018), 
https://www.massexoneration.com/bernie.html (describing the wrongful conviction of “Bernie” for 
child sexual assault in a Massachusetts daycare). 
In concert with the fashioning of mothers and the hysteria around the dangers 
of making a parenting mistake, courts were removing children from their moth-
ers’ custody for perceived missteps from this child-focused, homemaker ideal. 
Cases well into the 1980s and 1990s removed children from their mothers’ cus-
tody because courts questioned their “judgment” or “priorities” in light of their 
engagement in extramarital affairs, their desire for social lives and sex lives, and/ 
or their pursuit of a career.114 
108. SUSAN DOUGLAS & MEREDITH MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF 
MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN 9 (2004). 
109. RICHARD BECK, WE BELIEVE THE CHILDREN, xxiv (2015). 
110. See Susanna Martinez Guillem & Lisa A. Flores, Maternal Transgressions, Racial Regression: 
How Whiteness Mediates the (Worst) White Moms, in MEDIATED MOMS: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES 
TO THE MOTHERHOOD MYTH 80 (Heather L. Hundley & Sarah E. Hayden eds., 2016). 
111. DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 108, at 8–9. 
112.
113.
114. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Comparing Race and Sex Discrimination In Custody Cases, 
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 877, 884, n.35 (considering how the intersection of race and gender informed court 
decisions); D. Kelly Weisberg, Professional Women and the Professionalization of Motherhood: Marcia 
Clark’s Double Bind, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 295, 302–04 (1995) (discussing several cases of 
divorced lawyer-mothers, an “endangered species”). 
2020] THE UNEXAMINED LIFE 579 
In recent years, the energy and commitment to the mythical mommy has not 
abated, just changed form. In today’s media market, mothers are assaulted with 
literacy campaigns that assure them that their child’s outcomes exist in a binary, 
and what stands between the child’s “success” and a future of digging ditches is 
mothers and their selfless availability for hours of phonics and reading.115 
See Suzanne Smythe, The Good Mother: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Literacy Advice to 
Mothers in the 20th Century 4 (May 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0105017 (“[This mothering] is characterized by the increased 
pressure and expectations for mothers to raise literate, ‘successful’ children, hold down productive jobs, 
support their communities, manage a clean and a spacious home in a ‘good’ neighbourhood close to 
good schools, and not feel stressed while doing it ‘because stress is bad for your baby’” (citations 
omitted)). 
Bloggers aim to help mothers with these and myriad other useful tips; so many 
tips that an estimated 4.4 million bloggers are busy.116 
Neil Patel, 9 Things We Can Learn from the Mom Blog Industry, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilpatel/2016/11/03/9-things-we-can-learn-from-the-mom-blog-industry/ 
#56287a9d2181. 
And “[w]hile this kind of 
intensive parenting—constantly teaching and monitoring children—has been the 
norm for upper-middle-class parents since the 1990s, new research shows that 
people across class divides now consider it the best way to raise children, even if 
they don’t have the resources to enact it.”117 
One observes an unattainable portrayal of mothering for any parent. The ideal 
of a “doting, self-sacrificing mother” is not behind us even as working mothers 
are wooed and fashioned by a burgeoning labor market, and even as there persists 
a high intolerance for welfare assistance for stay-at-home mothers.118 
DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 108, at 6, 10-11. See also, Your New Bicycle, MOMISM (Mar. 
16, 2019), https://momism.substack.com/p/your-new-bicycle. 
Mothers 
are stylized and advertised as the primary “socializers” of their children, a con-
cept that depicts “mother” as an amalgamation of child psychologist, occupa-
tional therapist, linguist, and ever-patient playmate.119 While the “mommy myth” 
creates an existential trap for many parents, there are undeniable privileges for 
those who appear to conform—or aspire to conform—to its standards.120 But 
115.
116.
117. Cain Miller, supra note 112. 
118.
119. DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 108, at 10; see also Smythe, supra note 115 (describing a 
project out of McGill University, where Suzanne Smythe examined childhood literacy campaigns 
alongside notions of hyper-mothering and concluded “that contemporary literacy advice to parents is 
deeply rooted in the cultural ideal of the ‘good mother.’ Discourses of domestic pedagogy, intensive 
mothering, and the ‘normal’ family normalize middle class domesticity and the ideal of the good mother 
as essential to children’s literacy acquisition and academic success. The findings suggest that reliance 
upon women’s domestic literacy work to promote children’s academic success not only reproduces 
gender inequalities, but has implications for equity in literacy learning opportunities among diversely 
situated children and families”). 
120. See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 115, at 13 (saying “[t]his good mother is found in the powerful 
cultural image of the smiling, calm, patient, attentive, and sympathetic caregiver. She is ‘involved,’ 
always teaching, guiding, helping out at the school or play group. She is an ideal against which tired and 
cranky mothers like myself measure ourselves, and forever find ourselves lacking.” The portrayal 
“grounded in assumptions that mothering is both natural, a divinely ordained and biological calling, and 
inherently insufficient, always in need of expert guidance, the ideology of intensive mothering 
perpetuates the tension between best and worst”). See also Guillem & Flores, supra note 110, at 81. 
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invitation into the segregated club of the “good mother” and enjoyment of 
its privileges are nearly impossible for anyone not anticipated by the frame, 
namely anyone who is not a white, heterosexual, socioeconomically advantaged 
woman.121 
B. CAUSTIC NARRATIVES AND MISSING MOTHERS 
The narrative of the “good mother” is defined and reinforced in contrast to 
caustic counter narratives of “bad” mothers. Such a counter narrative is also a 
helpful distraction to prevent mothers from seriously evaluating the impossibility 
of the standards before them, or critiquing the inadequate systems in place to sup-
port them, such as affordable daycare or equitable and appropriate leave.122 The 
media provides just such a foil in its vivid and consistent portrayal of a false bi-
nary between effective mother and drain-on-society mother, which is ripe with 
gender and racial stereotyping.123 Moreover, the narrative of “good mother” thun-
ders so loudly it drowns out the voice and view of “other” mothers. This section 
takes up consideration of “mothers” that are ignored or subordinated, namely 
black and brown mothers, non-heteronormative mothers, and fathers. 
1. Black and Brown Mothers 
The “welfare mother” is portrayed consistently as a woman of color, despite 
the inaccuracy of that portrayal as a matter of statistics.124 
DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 108, at 176, 180. Conservative presidents find the image 
irresistible. See Ryan Sit, Trump Thinks Only Black People Are On Welfare, But Really, White 
Americans Receive Most Benefits, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/donald- 
trump-welfare-black-white-780252; Gene Demby, The Truth Behind the Lies of the Original “Welfare 
Queen,” ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/12/ 
20/255819681/the-truth-behind-the-lies-of-the-original-welfare-queen. 
She is presented as par-
ticipating in an endless state of inaction and complacency, a conclusion that also 
defies the data.125 The “welfare mom” is treated as an “object of journalistic scru-
tiny” and the “exemplar of a trend.”126 As someone else’s descriptive object, she 
is not the subject of her own life, an individual with a distinct and necessary nar-
rative; rather, the stereotyped version of her is the perfect entity against which the 
glossy mommy myth can be juxtaposed.127 
121. DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 108, at 21-22. 
122. Id. at 177. 
123. Id.; see also Guillem & Flores, supra note 110, at 80. 
124.
125. These images and accounts are offered as the picture of why there is welfare and welfare is a 
problem: welfare is the cause of their poverty; never mind that receipt of welfare is the effect of poverty. 
See DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 108, at 187. 
126. Id. at 180, 182. 
127. Id.; Christopher Karen, African Americans’ and Latinas’ Mothering Scripts: An Intersectional 
Analysis, 17 ADVANCES IN GENDER RES. 187, 208 (2013) (“While rich theoretical and empirical works 
explore women of color and their family lives, few to none ask mothers themselves to talk about their 
actual and ideal experiences of motherhood”). Consider, for example, the double standard of marriage as 
something that is necessary or ideal for mothering. A white celebrity in all her staged glory and living in 
an environment where she is buttressed by endless support and resources, can tell a story of her personal 
redemption and strength in her decision to be a single mother. The racialized object of “welfare mom,” 
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however, is scrutinized as having subjected herself, her children, and society at large to her irresponsible 
decision to mother a child alone. See DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 108, at 182; see also Serial, 
Season 3, Episode 2, You’ve Got Some Gauls, at 5:36, https://serialpodcast.org/season-three/2/youve- 
got-some-gauls (judge threatening young, black, male defendant that having any more children will be a 
violation of his probation). 
128. Guillem & Flores, supra note 110. But see Cain Miller, supra note 112. 
129.
Other than for use in depicting “welfare mom,” mothers of color are noticeably 
absent from the portrayal of mothering: 
In ways that are remarkably parallel to the silences and absences sur-
rounding race, class, and privileges [in early accounts of feminism], 
the popular literature on and the mediated accounts of intensive moth-
ering today rarely account for the deep investments in race and class 
privilege that surround both ideals of maternal perfection and the 
specific manifestation of intensive mothering and attachment 
parenting.128 
Meanwhile, mothers of color face unique challenges in terms of parenting chil-
dren in a racist society, and black children displaced from their homes or parented 
by white families face distinct vulnerabilities.129 
Azar & Benjet, supra note 2, at 249-68; Cain Miller, supra note 112 (citing Dawn Dow, a 
sociologist at the University of Maryland and her book, MOTHERING WHILE BLACK: BOUNDARIES AND 
BURDENS OF MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTHOOD); Ellen E. Pinderhughes et al., Youth of Color in Care: 
Intersecting Identities and Vulnerabilities, HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND PREJUDICE, 353-373 (2019); 
Rochaun Meadows-Fernandez, The Stress of Parenting While Black Can Take a Toll on Mental Health, 
THE ROOT (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.theroot.com/the-stress-of-parenting-while-black-can-take-a- 
toll-on-1823734422. 
Yet these necessary and complex 
conversations are rarely given voice as they are concerns not anticipated by, or 
taken on, in the white-centric view of mothering that predominates contemporary 
culture and the legal system.130 Quite the opposite—a systemic preference for 
white parenting was perpetuated by a surge in states’ removal of black children 
from their black parents.131 Black children comprise nearly half of the foster-care 
system today despite comprising one-fifth of the population of children.132 Many 
children were taken from their home by a system that unequivocally anticipates 
and privileges well-resourced parenting, Anglo family constellations, and modes 
of discipline that are not universally used or favored by all cultures.133 Black and 
brown families are denied a presumption of “parental fitness and valuable family 
ties” by the racist history of our child welfare system and systemic forces such as 
disproportionate poverty in black communities, the “retraction of public 
130. Azar & Benjet, supra note 2, at 249-68; Cain Miller, supra note 112; Pinderhughes et al., supra 
note 129; Meadows-Fernandez, supra note 129. 
131. See ROBERTS, supra note 68, at ix. 
132. ROBERTS, supra note 68, at vi. 
133. See generally Wendy Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty and Support, 25 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317 (2014); Pinderhughes et al., supra note 129, at 353-373; Azar & Benjet, 
supra note 2, at 249-68; ROBERTS, supra note 68, at ix. There are inescapable connections between this 
trend and the outcome for Paulette. See infra note 198. 
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assistance,” the school-to-prison pipeline, and the new Jim Crow.134 The effect of 
these forces has wreaked havoc on black families. 
Black and brown families are so often denied the presumption of basic fitness 
that courts find it a near impossible leap to credit access to black parenting as an 
affirmative plus in the BIC calculation.135 Not until 1984, when a white woman 
lost custody of her children because she married a black man, did the Court in 
Palmore v. Sidoti condemn “race-matching” in custodial decision making.136 
Prior to this decision, it was not at all uncommon for white women to lose custody 
of their white children when they married black men.137 While Palmore repre-
sented an important step for the courts in outlawing overt racist stereotyping of a 
black man or the white woman who would choose to be with him, it would be a 
mistake to interpret the rejection of “race-matching” for the proposition that 
courts cannot—or should not—see color. Such a basic analysis would forestall 
careful and nuanced consideration of how assuring a child access to the parent of 
the same race may be important for their physical and psychological care.138 
Position Paper on Trans-Racial Adoptions, NAT’L ASS’N OF BLACK SOC. WORKERS (Sep. 1972) 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nabsw.org/resource/collection/E1582D77-E4CD-4104-996A-D42D08F9 
CA7D/NABSW_Trans-Racial_Adoption_1972_Position_(b).pdf. 
Denial of these arguments have routinely subordinated the efforts of black and 
brown parents to raise their children.139 
2. Non-Heteronormative “Mothers”140 
Mothers of color are not the only faces missing or mischaracterized in the por-
trayal of ideal mothers. While there has been slow progress toward the acceptance 
134. ROBERTS, supra note 68, at vii, 67; Perry, supra note 91, at 52-53. 
135. See, e.g., Adoption of Azziza, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 1106 (2012) (noting that “[t]he father is not a 
proxy for the tribe; there is no evidence in the record that contact with the father would result in a greater 
sense of cultural or racial identity”); Adoption of Isadore, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1133 (2014) (finding 
unpersuasive the father’s claim “that the judge erred by not considering his racial heritage” because he 
failed to show that “he would be the only connection the children have to their African-American 
heritage or that his relationship with them had a significant effect on the development of their racial 
identity”). 
136. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the 
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”). 
137. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 91, at 60-61, n.32. 
138.
139. See, e.g., Adoption of Persephone, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 at *2 (2013) (holding that without 
evidence of race of foster parents or evidence that they would be unable to meet the needs of the children 
to connect, the judge could not evaluate whether lower court properly considered “their need for 
connection to their racial and cultural heritage” on visitation order); Adoption of Eaton, 2016 Mass. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 914 (affirming termination of parental rights despite mother’s argument that the 
“judge failed to consider evidence that the [white] potential adoptive mother. . .experienced difficulty 
with managing the texture of Eaton’s hair”); Adoption of Ynez, 2009 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1158, 
n.4, *2 (noting that “Ynez’s mother is Caucasian and her father is African-American” and “[t]he experts 
agreed that the [impliedly white] foster family is actively engaged in meeting Ynez’s needs and supports 
her connection to her biracial heritage,” despite father’s assertion of gender discrimination and claims 
that the judge failed to consider possible kinship care with Ynez’s paternal [black] aunt). 
140. With thanks to research assistant Monica Allard for her specific and wise contributions on queer 
theory and mothering in these and other sections of the Article. 
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of homosexuality and transgender people generally, these lived experiences are 
still nearly absent in consideration of mothering.141 
Massey et al., supra note 103, at 280 (discussing how rate of approval for same-sex parenting 
appears to track with growth in the number—ergo visibility—of same-sex households); Rebecca L. 
Stotzer et al., Transgender Parenting: A Review of Existing Research, UCLA: THE WILLIAMS INST. 16 
(2014), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3rp0v7qv (highlighting areas for needed research). 
The subordinate position of 
these “mothers” is the result of historical perceptions of illegitimacy: homosex-
uals do not participate in legitimate relationships, and transgender persons do not 
express their gender in a legitimate way.142 These perceptions of illegitimacy 
then crowded into the view of homosexuals or transgender persons as parents.143 
The inadequate regard of homosexual and transgender parents silences those 
parents: “[a]n erasure need not take place for us to be silenced. Tokenistic, objec-
tifying voyeuristic inclusion is at least as damaging as exclusion. We are as 
silenced when we appear in the margins as we are when we fail to appear at 
all.”144 
Correspondingly, courts continue to demonstrate a preference for heterosex-
uality in the application of the BIC standard and the timeless insistence on a nar-
row definition of sexual propriety and legitimate identity.145 
Beth A. Haines et al., Making Trans Parents Visible: Intersectionality of Trans and Parenting 
Identities, 24 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 238, 238-39, 244 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1177/095935 
3514526219. 
LGBTQ parents 
suffer from the notion that their parenting is either less beneficial than that of het-
eronormative mothers, or worse, that it is affirmatively damaging. Courts, influ-
enced by stereotypes (conscious or subconscious) that a trans person transitioning 
or that a lesbian or gay relationship will confuse or distress a child, can all too 
easily convert the perceived risk of confusing or distressing a child into the actual 
harm of the distress and confusion caused by a child being alienated or removed 
from their parent.146 
Specifically, for a child of a trans parent who is in the process of transitioning 
after their child’s birth, depending on the child’s age, the child may of course 
need time to process this transition. However, the child is arguably better situated 
141.
142. Michelle Bograd, Strengthening Domestic Violence Theories: Intersections of Race, Class, 
Sexual Orientation, and Gender, 25 J. OF MARITAL AND FAM. THERAPY 275, 280 (2007). 
143. Massey et al., supra note 103, at 130; Stotzer et al., supra note 141, at 16. Consider, for 
example, that in both a 2007 study and a 2010 study, only 12% of Americans surveyed thought gay and 
lesbian couples raising children was a good thing. In the 2007 study, 52% affirmatively felt the trend 
was a bad thing—in 2010, those holding this negative view only fell to 42%. See Massey et al., supra 
note 103, at 131. In contrast, several 2011 studies suggest attitudes toward gays and lesbians have been 
improving and, perhaps relatedly, so have attitudes toward parenting by homosexuals. See id. 
144. See Bograd, supra note 142, at 275 (citing Kimberlee Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Violence 
Against Women, in FAMILY MATTERS: READINGS ON FAMILY LIVES AND THE LAW, at 116 (Martha 
Minow ed., 1993)); see also Lorelei Carpenter & Helena Austin, Silenced, Silent, Silent: Motherhood in 
the Margins, 13 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 660, 662 (2007) (describing how the notion of “so much more to 
say” acts as “a means for silencing mothers;” certain things “remain[] unsaid” or are “drowned out by 
what is being said”). 
145.
146. Id. at 243 (“For example, parents reported that their trans identity was used against them in 
conflicts over visitation or custody. Fear of or experienced discrimination in family court is a major 
stressor that can interfere with trans parents’ ability to parent.”). 
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to make observations, ask questions, and reconcile the changes if the child is with 
the transitioning parent.147 Further, for a child who themselves identifies as 
LGBTQþ, family engagement with the queer community may actively benefit 
the child; while it is possible for a cisgender and heterosexual parent to be “sup-
portive” of a child’s emerging gender identity and sexuality, they may not be in 
the best position to do so.148 Meanwhile, there are measured, higher rates of abuse 
and family rejection of LGBTQþ youth tied to their gender identity and sexual-
ity. These youth are overrepresented in the foster-care system, experience more 
movement between foster-care placements, and are more likely to be relegated to 
a group-home setting.149 
Bianca D.M. Wilson et al., Sexual and Gender Minority Youth in Foster Care, THE WILLIAMS 
INST. (August 2014), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LAFYS_report_final- 
aug-2014.pdf. 
The rhetoric of lesbian and gay parenting as damaging stoked the arguments 
against same-sex marriage.150 
Glenn Stanton, Key Findings of Mark Regnerus’ New Family Structure Study, FOCUS ON THE 
FAMILY (Oct. 6, 2012), https://www.focusonthefamily.com/faith/key-findings-of-mark-regnerus-new- 
family-structure-study/ (providing favorable commentary about the controversial Regnerus study that 
purported to conclude that, as compared to “off-spring from married, intact mother/father homes, 
children raised in same-sex homes are markedly more likely to” have negative social and educational 
outcomes). 
Throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first 
century, courts have denied custody or visitation to lesbian women.151 Prior to 
Obergefell v. Hodges, thirteen states did not allow LGBTQþ families to adopt 
through the state foster-care system; still today, LGBTQþ men and women are 
barred from adoption in Mississippi, and several states allow private adoption 
agencies to decline service to any person or couple whose lifestyle conflicts with 
“sincerely held religious beliefs.”152 
Rebecca Beitsch, Many States Still Prohibit Gay Adoption, GOVERNING (Aug. 19, 2015), https:// 
www.governing.com/topics/politics/despite-same-sex-marriage-ruling-gay-adoption-rights-uncertain- 
in-some-states.html. 
Meanwhile, transgender parents often suffer from brutal recriminations and 
discrimination.153 Currently, there are only six states that expressly prohibit dis-
crimination against transgender parents, making trans rights unstable in most 
states.154 LGBTQþ parents provoke an ire that is related to—though more seis-
mic than—the beliefs that fuel the doubt or denial of fathers’ capacity to mother. 
147. Id. at 244 (quoting a 2006 study finding that children need to “’transition’ as well; they need 
time to process their own feelings and comprehend the loss of a parent’s previous gendered identity.”).  
148. Sabra L. Katz-Wise, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth and Family Acceptance, 
63 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA, 1011, 1014 (2016) (discussing the importance of parent- 
child attachment and youth dependence on adults, “especially parents,” both to assist them with meeting 
developmental demands and to guide their personal experiences in various domains and settings.”). 
149.
150.
151. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (2002); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980); 
see also Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642 N.E.2d 1007 (1994) (striking down trial court conditions and 
declaring homosexuality as insufficient basis for establishing parental unfitness, but noting that 
“flagrant” homosexuality might be a problem and affirming practice of scrutinizing the matter). 
152.
153. Stotzer et al., supra note 141, at 16 (referencing Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56 (1986); Magnusun v. 
Magnusun, 170 P.3d 65 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015)). 
154. Id. at 4 (CA, CT, NJ, NM, NY, and RI). 
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LGBTQþ families, which include families where there are two mothers, or a 
mother who was or “should have been” a father (trans woman), a father who was 
or “should have been” a mother (trans man), or two fathers and no mothers, are 
cast aside as “pseudo families.” These families defy the dominant narrative that 
there must be a mother and that she will be a cis heterosexual, a known and static 
commodity.155 
Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2331 (2017), https://www. 
yalelawjournal.org/article/the-nature-of-parenthood; Ramona Faith Oswald et al., Decentering 
Heteronormativity: A Model for Family Studies, SOURCEBOOK OF FAMILY THEORY AND RESEARCH 144– 
46 (2005) (discussing the “gender binary” and “sexuality binary” of heteronormativity).  
3. Fathers as “Mothers” 
Meanwhile, in all the discussions of what children need and how those needs 
must be attended to—from children’s books to popular media to “what to expect 
when you’re expecting”156—there is little to no discussion of the role of 
fathers.157 Consider a popular pastime: judging other people’s parenting. This ac-
tivity offers a ripe opportunity to crucify fathers right along with mothers, yet 
popular media reactions and even prosecutions often home in entirely on the 
mother’s role in the perceived transgression. From reactions to reality television 
stars, like “Mama June” and the various “Real Housewives,”158 
See, e.g., Jaclyn Hendricks, Teresa Giudice Slammed Over 9-year-old’s Birthday Outfit, PAGE 
SIX (Sep. 19, 2018), https://pagesix.com/2018/09/19/teresa-giudice-slammed-over-9-year-olds- 
birthday-outfit/. See also Sharon Mazzarella, “It is What It Is”: Here Comes Honey Boo Boo’s 
“Mama” June Shannon as Unruly Mother, in MEDIATED MOMS: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO 
THE MOTHERHOOD MYTH 125 (Heather L. Hundley & Sarah E. Hayden eds., 2016). 
to cases of prose-
cution for reckless parenting and the media coverage that follows, one has to look 
hard to find mention of the fathers of these children, if there is any mention at 
all.159 While the focus on mothers smacks of the larger epidemic of finger- 
pointing at failed mothering as a warning to all mothers who may falter, the 
exclusive focus on mothers hurts fathers, too. 
When fathers are excluded from the description of caring for children, even the 
critique of a parenting choice, the default position that anticipates their absence is 
reinforced. A likely source of this default position is the statistical reality that 
one-third of children in the United States do not live with their biological 
fathers,160 and studies have consistently shown that there is marked inequity 
between the involvement of mothers and fathers in the one-on-one interactions 
155.
156. Now in its fifth edition and still featuring a picture of a coiffed white woman on the cover. 
157. See e.g., Anderson & Hamilton, supra note 101 (studying the portrayal of fathers in children’s 
books to explore stereotypes of fathers as absent or inept). 
158.
159. See e.g., Kari E. Hong & Philip L. Torrey, What Matter of Soram Got Wrong: “Child Abuse” 
Crimes that May Trigger Deportation Are Constantly Evolving and Even Target Good Parents, 
HARVARD CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 54, 64 (2019) (discussing cases in Montana and Florida where 
mothers were arrested and criminally charged for leaving their children at malls and parks 
unsupervised). 
160. Saijun Zhang & Tamara Fuller, Neighborhood Disorder and Paternal Involvement of 
Nonresident and Resident Fathers, 61 FAM. RELATIONS 501, 501 (2012). 
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with their children.161 However, the problem is that these truths are cast as inevi-
table, elemental, and irreversible. Even in situations where men are poised and 
asking to take full and complete responsibility, there is a gravitational pull, as we 
will see in Norman’s case, to ask: yes, but where is the child’s mother?162 
Black men are particularly vulnerable to gendered stereotyping as they swim 
upstream against legalized disenfranchisement: disproportionate incarceration 
rates,163 
Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP (Accessed Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.naacp.org/ 
criminal-justice-fact-sheet/. 
loss of right to vote due to felony convictions,164 
Jennifer Rae Taylor, Jim Crow’s Lasting Legacy at the Ballot Box, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Aug. 20, 2018, 10:00 P.M.), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/20/jim-crow-s-lasting- 
legacy-at-the-ballot-box. 
high rates of unemploy- 
ment,165 
Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2018, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
(October 2019), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2018/home.htm. 
and pay inequity.166 
The Gender Wage Gap: 2018 Earnings Differences by Race and Ethnicity, INST. FOR WOMEN’S 
POL’Y RESEARCH (March 2019), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/C478_Gender-Wage- 
Gap-in-2018.pdf. 
These inequities often leave black fathers on their 
back foot in the eyes of the court and create the perception that they are not capa-
ble caregivers.167 This notion is insensitive and myopic when applied to fathers 
besieged by such challenges; it transcends to levels of repugnancy when it is 
applied to all black men in a stereotypical way regardless of their current circum-
stances. The notion of physical and emotional distance between fathers and their 
children, or of their lack of prowess or interest in “mothering,” is unfortunate 
given the numerous studies—not to mention personal narratives of children and 
fathers—that link father-child closeness and fathers’ assumption of parenting 
responsibilities with children’s social, psychological, cognitive, and behavioral 
well-being.168 
The power of these narratives has had tangible, real-word effects on case out-
comes where the dominant culture may conflict with, or presuppose, a litigant’s 
lived experiences. If we recognize that judges—our fact finders—are sitting in 
the world described above, we can anticipate how this worldview may guide 
what they will see and hear and credit, and by extension, how they will apply the 
BIC standard.169 
161. Id. at 502–03. 
162. See In the Interest of M.M.M and S.H.M, 428 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014). The father of 
twins sought declaratory judgement that the gestational surrogate did not have a parental relationship 
with the children, nor standing to pursue rights to the children. Id. Yet, the court ruled in favor of the 





167. ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 264. 
168. Id. 
169. Critical theorists have been noticing for years that certain needs are normed and therefore 
anticipated and privileged, while others are unaccounted for or expressly disadvantaged. See Bell, 
Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 80, at 899–900 (citing Stanley Fish in stating, 
“critical legal studies’ view of legal precedent is not a formal mechanism for determining outcomes in a 
neutral fashion—as traditional legal scholars maintain—but is rather a ramshackle ad hoc affair whose 
ill-fitting joints are soldered together by suspect rhetorical gestures, leaps of illogic, and special pleading 
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C. NORMAN AND PAULETTE AS “MOTHER” 
Let us consider Norman’s and Paulette’s cases. While race, gender, and hetero-
normativity cannot be dispositive factors in a custody determination, such criteria 
remain deeply imbedded in the BIC analysis.170 Permissible consideration of race 
and its role in family identity and a child’s upbringing is risky, as being inten-
tional and respectfully curious about race is very complicated.171 
Consider the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) which, in a 1972 
position statement, offered a collective opinion that white homes were not suitable for black children, 
but moreover unnecessary if the child welfare system were to prioritize reunification or failing that 
family placements and acceptance of black adoptive families. See Position Paper on Trans-Racial 
Adoptions, NAT’L ASS’N OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS (Sept. 1972), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www. 
nabsw.org/resource/collection/E1582D77-E4CD-4104-996A-D42D08F9CA7D/NABSW_Trans-Racial_ 
Adoption_1972_Position_(b).pdf. As recently as 2014, leadership in the NABSW clarified or expanded 
their position to state that “families considering interracial adoption should be prepared by their agencies 
to understand the pervasive impact of race on achievement, self-esteem, self-concept and mental health. 
Adoptive parents of black children should recognize and combat the pervasiveness of institutional and 
individual racism. They should ensure that black children are connected to appropriate black role models, 
and are not racially isolated.” See J. Toni Oliver, Adoptions Should Consider Black Children and Black 
Families, N.Y. TIMES OPINION (2014).  
The far greater 
risk, however, is the importation of unconscious assumptions and biases concern-
ing race as it relates to the care and control of children.172 Layered on top of this 
worry are those biases related to gender and the associated expectations for role 
within the family unit. 
1. Norman 
In Norman’s case, there was testimony that he felt deeply connected to his 
Jamaican roots and wished for his daughter to know that connection as well. 
Norman testified to his pleasure and sense of duty in taking care of his ailing 
parents, his closeness with his family, and his desire for his daughter to know her 
family and her heritage. He spoke of his and his daughter’s mutual love for 
Jamaican cuisine, including their practice of learning to cook dishes together. In 
support of his stated desire to parent more, Norman described how he and his 
daughter spent time together, how they cooked, walked their dog, and were day-
dreaming about growing her “slime” business (a “business” that at this stage 
sweetly consisted of her making a mess and passing the treasured slime off to her 
friends at recess). He explained that he enjoyed working fewer hours and felt he 
could get by on the reduced salary, since more equal custodial control of his 
daughter eliminated the need to pay for childcare, resulting in a downward adjust-
ment in child support. Norman testified that he did not plan to try to work more 
tricked up as general rules, all in the service of a decidedly partisan agenda that wants to wrap itself in 
the mantle and majesty of law.”). 
170. See Jones v. Jones, 542 N.W.2d 119, 123–24 (S.D. 1996) (allowing consideration of race as it 
relates to a child’s ethnic heritage and the parent’s ability to expose the child to it); see also Davis v. 
Davis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (allowing that race is a factor to be considered 
along with other considerations of family life); Perry, supra note 91, at 55. 
171.
172. Rashmi Goel, From Tainted to Sainted: The View of Interracial Relations as Cultural 
Evangelism, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 489, 521 (2007); Perry, supra note 91, at 57. 
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hours or find another job if instead, he could spend time with his daughter, as was 
his express desire. Even still, the judge made no findings of facts concerning any 
of this testimony so it is unclear if she noted it at all. 
Here, the narrative of Norman’s lived experience with his daughter, a narrative 
that was undisputed at trial, is entirely consistent with a 2013 study from 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention concerning the role of fathers in 
the lives of their children. Black fathers living with children were likely to have 
bathed, dressed, diapered, and helped young children with the bathroom; shared 
meals with their children; played with their children; transported their children to 
activities; assisted with homework and discussed the day’s events.173 
Jo Jones & William Mosher, NAT’L HEALTH STATISTIC REPORT: FATHERS’ INVOLVEMENT WITH 
THEIR CHILDREN 13-20 (2013), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr071.pdf. 
They out-
ranked white and Hispanic fathers in all these regards.174 Of black fathers not liv-
ing with their children, approximately 50% spoke to their children about their day 
several times a week.175 They also helped children with homework at levels that 
outpaced white and Hispanic fathers.176 
Nonetheless, Norman’s testimony, even as it is situated in a statistical reality, 
paled in comparison to the constant messaging—the dominant narrative—about 
what it means to be a good father (a provider) and what it means to be a black fa-
ther (absent, criminal, or ineffective).177 The opposing party knew this drumbeat 
and beat it well, implying on cross examination that Norman was only seeking 
more custody to avoid child support and that his “mommy” hours were the prod-
uct of a lack of productivity or drive, not the feature of a parent making a choice 
about use of time. Norman’s choice “queered” his family because it moved them 
away from traditional gender roles and toward more egalitarian parenting.178 A 
judge conscious of queer theory might see Norman’s decision to spend more time 
in a caregiving role differently and indeed as an affirmative benefit.179 For exam-
ple, Norman’s child will receive ample gender-role messaging from our patriar-
chal and sexist society, but Norman’s modeling offers her an alternate model to 
consider as she begins to discover her own gender identity and role in the 
world.180 
Unfortunately, these nuanced benefits of Norman’s parenting style were seem-
ingly lost on the judge. Who is to say precisely what was going through the mind 
of the judge in Norman’s case; indeed, she herself may not have even been able 
173.
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 19. 
176. Id. at 20. 
177. See ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 66; see also Serial, supra note 127 (beginning 5:36, depicting a 
sentencing hearing illustrating the racist and gendered themes readily employed by this and many 
judges). 
178. Oswald et al., supra note 155, at 148 (discussing couples who “partially queer their families” 
through “steadfast commitment to “mutual control over the family economy, and equal responsibility 
for childcare. . . gender difference no longer figures in how a family gets done.”). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 144-45, 152. 
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to say, because “[perceptions of African Americans as ‘dangerous, different, or 
subordinate . . . are lessons learned and internalized [often]181 outside of our 
awareness.”182 Norman’s case presents a strong example of how difficult it is to 
know with certainty if bias informed a judge’s determination. The judge did not 
make any antagonistic findings about Norman; rather, she made very few findings 
about him at all. Instead, she emphasized only the mother’s capacity and her 
affection, reduced Norman’s custodial time, and wrapped it all up with a bow by 
declaring it was in the child’s best interest. Whatever she was thinking was likely 
mediated through the constant messaging about black men as unreliable fathers. 
How else would the persuasive testimony—the heartfelt descriptions—of 
Norman’s role in his daughter’s life be so easily dismissed? With the rigid fram-
ing of the black father already presupposed, how easy, therefore, it might have 
been to deem Norman an unreliable narrator, and how easy to ignore the voice of 
a father if one was only listening or framing the proceedings as being about 
mothering.183 
2. Paulette 
Paulette’s case was also ripe for application of race and gender stereotypes. 
Paulette offered a clear explanation for her choices as a parent: 
They cry a little bit, oh, Daddy, and he does anything they want and I 
have no problem saying no because I believe loving, saying no, is also 
part of loving and caring and protecting. I want them to be ready to the 
outside world (sic) and they’re going to be hearing a lot of no’s, like I 
have been. You know? I just got another no today on a job application. 
What do I do? Cry? Run to mommy? I can’t do that. I want my girls, 
female, like women in the world, in this United States of America, you 
have to be strong and I want to help prepare them for that too. Because I 
always tell them, you’re already very smart and you’re very pretty . . . if 
you are not polite. . . [and] you don’t respect Mommy and Daddy or peo-
ple around you . . . that is no good.184 
181. ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 66. The quote is actually “completely outside of our awareness.” I 
do not think all of our socialization to racism is quite as invisible. I believe, rather, if we are honest, the 
white supremacist culture is supported by both spoken and unspoken mores. Id. 
182. Id. (citing United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 780–81 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (acknowledging 
the racism inherent in Congress’ sentencing scheme that “gave (Black) crack offenders longer sentences 
than (white) cocaine offenders”)). 
183. See Carla Adkison-Bradley, Seeing African Americans as Competent Parents: Implications for 
Family Counselors, 19(3) THE FAM. J. 307, 308-09 (2011); ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 66; see also 
Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2000) 
(discussing how physical expressions are particular to different cultures due to, among other things, 
“display rules” that “govern the management of facial behavior in particular social settings.” “Display 
rules” have been shown to impede cross-cultural lie detection.). 
184. Transcript of Record, Day 1, p. 123-24 (confidential source on file with author). 
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Her framework for discipline was one that had everything to do with her social-
ization as a black woman185 
See Shona Smith, Acclaimed Relationship Expert Kenneth V. Hardy Leads Workshop Series on 
Race for BCSSW Faculty, Staff, and Students, BCSSW NEWS (June 3, 2019), https://www.bc.edu/ 
content/bc-web/schools/ssw/bcssw-news/2019/kenneth-v-hardy-leads-workshop-series.html (quoting 
Professor Hardy as saying “[p]eople of color have reported an explicit awareness of their race as early as 
age three, while white people report that awareness as occurring implicitly, and as late as in their 20s and 
early 30s.”). 
and, specifically, her sense of raising black girls.186 
Where the judge was seemingly unmoved by this account,187 
The judge being unpersuaded may have been the product of her being a white woman, and 
therefore someone less likely to know, adopt, or endorse Paulette’s framework for discipline. But it is 
important to note that both difference and sameness in terms of identity can frustrate one’s connection to 
the other. Not every connection between similarly raced people, for example, will be one of empathy or 
understanding. See JAMES FORMAN, LOCKING UP OUR OWN 8-9 (2017) (describing the complicated and 
sometimes overlapping mix of impulses black officials, including judges, displayed in the face of a surge 
of black criminal defendants; thus providing a thoughtful, critical reminder to resist essentialism—there 
is no such thing as one black experience or one judicial response). Offering another explanation, 
Domingo Martinez states, “[t]here is nothing more potentially hostile than the indigenous ego 
interpreting the laws of his conqueror upon his own people.” See Take Your Kid to Work Day, THIS 
AMERICAN LIFE (Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/477/getting-away-with-it/act-one-4; 
DOMINGO MARTINEZ, THE BOY KINGS OF TEXAS (2012). 
social science 
researchers would not be so dismissive of Paulette. Indeed, Paulette’s logic tracks 
with a known theme in studies of parenting by black parents.188 Many black 
parents believe that their children have “little room for error.”189 This phenomenon 
is more pronounced for adolescents, as black adolescents are at increased risk of 
hostile harassment and stereotyping; meanwhile, adolescence for any child is a pe-
riod of development marked by a need for, and claims at, autonomy.190 The com-
bination of these forces can provoke some black parents to use pronounced 
discipline with their children. Absent an understanding of this context, the choices 
and motivations of some black parents as they navigate a combustible period in 
their child’s life may be foreign to a white person—especially a white judge. 
In Paulette’s case, however, she not only offered the context clearly to explain 
her exacting standards, but she also consistently and emphatically denied any cor-
poral punishment. Surely this is the best of both worlds: an explanation of some-
thing unfamiliar with an assurance that no harm was done. Yet the judge did not 
hear or credit the testimony. Or, perhaps she did hear it, but made sense of it as 
providing an unsympathetic motive, a motive that plays into a racial stereotype 
that black families are “hard” on their children and always resort to physical dis-
cipline.191 While this is a widely held belief, it is untrue.192 Multiple studies have 
185.
186. See Carla Adkison-Bradley et al., Child Discipline in African American Families: A Study of 
Patterns and Context, 22 THE FAM. J. 198, 203-04 (2014). 
187.




192. Id. (concluding that “[t]his finding concurs with previous research on African American 
disciplinary practices that show that African American parents often discuss matters with children and 
reserve physical discipline for more severe contextual situations”). 
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shown that black parents often discuss matters with children and reserve physical 
discipline for more severe contextual situations.193 Further, studies have also con-
firmed that, while black parents do employ an authoritarian parenting style more 
often than white parents, researchers have long and consistently found that, for 
children in black families, this parenting style is not linked with adverse behavior 
outcomes.194 On the contrary, more authoritarian parenting may have psychologi-
cally protective aspects leading to positive developmental outcomes.195 
There was plenty of evidence that suggested Paulette’s telling of the facts, and 
supported by the research literature, held true in this case. There was undisputed 
evidence, cited by the judge in fact, that the children were flourishing in school, 
involved in loving relationships with extended family, sociable and happy in 
extracurricular activities, and—critically—bonded to both their parents. Yet the 
judge placed no value on these facts and went on to place extraordinarily punitive 
relief into effect. Ultimately, the judge’s finding of facts provided only a tapestry 
of irreconcilable stereotypes of black women and girls that punished Paulette. 
The judge did not credit Paulette’s testimony that her husband was controlling 
about finances and decision making; for example, Paulette testified that he 
insisted on reviewing receipts from the grocery store and sent her back if she 
bought the wrong thing. In response, the judge stated, “I discredit your testimony 
where you testified that [Petitioner] was overbearing and didn’t let you get a 
word in. You’re an educated woman, you have your own bank account, indeed, 
you were the primary person bringing income into the family, so I don’t think he 
overpowered you.”196 With these words, the judge summoned up the racist 
schema of black women as hard women.197 Meanwhile, even while naming 
Paulette’s education, independence, and professional presence, she did not credit 
these traits as important or commutable to her children. When Paulette insisted 
that her disciplinary strategy was focused on making the girls strong and capable 
of living as black girls in America, the judge could only label her discipline as 
cruel.198 The judge’s remedy for this perceived cruelty was, predictably, a script 
193. Id. 
194. Kristin Valentino et al., Intergenerational Continuity of Child Abuse Among Adolescent 
Mothers: Authoritarian Parenting, Community Violence, and Race, 17 CHILD MALTREATMENT 172, 174 
(2012). 
195. Id. 
196. Transcript of Record, Day 2, p. 112 (confidential source on file with author). 
197. See ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 60-67 (offering overview of the caricatures of black mothers, 
from the incapable slave mother to the dysfunctional matriarch of the Moynihan report, to the addled 
“crack mom,” to the welfare queen). Indeed, in Paulette’s case, the judge even extended her critiques to 
Paulette’s own mother: “she believes how her mother raised her was the right way because she 
[Paulette] has done so well. . . her job is to prepare her children for life, just the way she learned from her 
mother. . . but I think she went beyond any appropriate discipline.” Transcript of Record, Day 2, p. 114 
(confidential source on file with author). 
198. In Paulette’s case, the judge relied on double hearsay testimony to justify her conclusion that 
Paulette was a battering mother. After providing her findings of facts and conclusion of law from the 
bench, the judge left the parties to navigate some logistics. When she returned, she stated: “And I’m not 
sure whether I thought this or mentioned this during my findings of fact, I thought it was very probative 
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of “white supervision.”199 Indeed the judge went on to say “I know that [you love 
your girls], and I hope that in the future, you will have a healthy, loving relation-
ship with your children and I think that you, (sic) maybe these parenting classes 
and the family violence classes will get you there sooner.”200 
Lived experiences, in concert with jurisprudential and societal messaging, cre-
ate certain world views and orientations toward cases and clients, but many 
judges are blind to this reality.201 When advocates argue for new ways to parent 
in the twenty-first century, or when they advocate for people whose identities or 
actions do not fit into an archetypical mold, they must inspire judges to take a 
wider view of themselves and of people, places, and things.202 Consideration of 
the training and professional development of therapists surfaces concepts that can 
recalibrate the judiciary toward less biased, more rational, but also empathic 
analysis. 
IV. COURTROOMS AND COUCHES 
A trial puts the fact finder into a relationship with a litigant, and in the context 
of family law, this relationship is marked by a contrived intimacy with the liti-
gant. The judge is learning about private family matters while also ostensibly act-
ing with neutrality and objectivity. While a judge’s role and function are, of 
that [the Petitioner’s] father reported that [eldest child] reported physical discipline or physical, I don’t 
want to call it discipline, but reported to the grandmother that her mother was hitting her. . . that was 
very probative.” See Transcript of Record, Day 2, p. 116 (confidential source on file with the author). 
Leaving aside the double hearsay issue, closer inspection of the testimony indicates that it is not even 
clear what discipline or level of contact the child was describing: “Q: In [child’s] conversation, do you 
know if she was speaking about spanking or about some other form of physical discipline? A: We don’t 
know. . . Q: And. . . did you ever notice any abnormal bumps, bruises, scratches or welts on them? A: 
No. . . Q: and have you ever seen [Paulette] discipline the children? A: Yes. . . she basically was 
criticized as she uses a very harsh tone. . .” See id. 
199. See ROBERTS, supra note 68, at ix (stating argument that racial inequities in the child welfare 
system cause “serious group-based harms by reinforcing disparaging stereotypes about Black families’ 
unfitness and the need for white supervision, by destroying a sense of family autonomy and self- 
determination among many Black Americans, and by weakening Black Americans’ collective ability to 
overcome institutionalized discrimination.”). 
200. The judge linked Paulette’s desires to parent with a primal urge, rather than something about 
which Paulette may have intentionally reasoned. She went on to juxtapose that primal urge with the 
ability to do so well. When after hearing an oral accounting of the judge’s findings of facts and rulings of 
law, Paulette spontaneously said, “I just want to be with my children.” The court replied: “I know you 
want to be with your children, ma’am, I think there’s probably no greater primal desire than to want to 
be with your children, I know that and I hope that in the future, you will have a healthy, loving 
relationship with your children, and I think that you, maybe with these parenting classes and the family 
violence classes will get there sooner. Yes?” Transcript of Record, Day 2, p. 121-22 (confidential source 
on file with author). This conjures up post-Emancipation sentiments: “White lamented the loss of the 
moral guidance that slavery provided Black mothers . . . Their purely animal passions toward their 
children [ ] led to horrible abuses: ‘When they are little, she indulges them blindly when she is in good 
humor, and beats them cruelly when she is angry.’” See ROBERTS, supra note 68, at 62; Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
201. STEELE, supra note 95, at 14 (stating that “our understandings and views of the world are partial 
and reflect the circumstances of our particular lives”); see also Lawrence, supra note 9, at 380. 
202. King & Weselmann, supra note 10, at 269. 
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course, quite different than a therapist,203 the space judges occupy shares a feature 
of intimacy present in the therapeutic relationship, too. This is undeniably true in 
a family court, where the material discussed is of a deeply personal nature. 
Moreover, the context is familiar: someone is speaking, someone is listening. In 
listening, a therapist or judge endeavors to listen-to-learn, and specifically, to 
learn something about who the speaker is and the speaker’s observations of the 
world around them. In speaking, both the therapy client and the litigant are 
expecting to be heard and validated.204 
Those in the listening professions, such as therapists or social workers, do 
many things as part of their schooling and ongoing professional development to 
prepare to enter intimate spaces with clients. For example, therapists make 
decided efforts to examine their own lives in order to know themselves and cri-
tique the ways in which a sense of self may inform, but also distort, one’s sense 
of other.205 Social workers are additionally attuned to person-in-environment: the 
notion that one should approach examination of another person’s life with a sense 
of humility and respectful curiosity, understanding that how people define prob-
lems, communicate, and make choices is a function of their distinct experiences, 
culture, and identity.206 This section will lay out several principles that therapists 
are trained in to promote their ability to listen properly, and to investigate with 
curiosity and openness. 
A. COUCHES 
Therapists, in their formal training, learn about countertransference, bias, and 
stereotyping, all of which acknowledge the importance of self-awareness in order 
to gain control over one’s reactions and cognition as one attends to the story of 
another. Those in social science also learn about “myside” bias, a worrisome bias 
that can distort hypotheses, what evidence is gathered, and how gathered evi-
dence is perceived. Relatedly, therapists learn about cognitive dissonance and 
203. A judge is not someone a litigant seeks out for one-on-one conversation toward self- 
actualization or improved mental health and functionality. Moreover, a litigant cannot ask for referrals 
for a judge as they would for a therapist. They cannot go for an initial visit with a judge to see if they feel 
a sense of safety or rapport before committing to the judge; they simply hope for these things. 
204. If a case has reached trial, it is a safe assumption that it did so because the disputes of fact 
prevented disposing of the case as a matter of law, so one can assume the facts are nuanced or 
complicated. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Disputes of fact, in turn, are resolved by the fact finder 
making a credibility determination regarding the legitimacy of differing accounts. CRIM. MODEL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE IN THE DIST. CT. INSTRUCTION 2.120 (Admin. Office of the Dist. Ct., Commw. 
of Mass. 2009); MASS. SUP. CT. CIV. PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.11.1(a) (revised 2018) 
(discussing reality of dispute of fact in a trial and fact finders’ duties therein). 
205. See Rene T. Chapman, Internalized Racism of the Clinician and the Treatment Dynamic, 6:2-3 
J. OF EMOTIONAL ABUSE 219, 228 (2006); Joseph Walsh, Supervising the Countertransference 
Reactions of Case Managers, 21(2) THE CLINICAL SUPERVISOR 129–30 (2002). 
206. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NAT’L ASS’N OF SOCIAL WORKERS (stating “Social workers treat each 
person in a caring and respectful fashion, mindful of individual differences and cultural and ethnic 
diversity. Social workers promote clients’ socially responsible self-determination. Social workers seek 
to enhance clients’ capacity and opportunity to change and to address their own needs.”). 
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defense mechanisms, concepts explaining perceptions of, and reactions to, narra-
tives and observations that conflict with one’s own cognition. These frames of 
reference are relevant to a judicial fact-finder, who must similarly listen carefully, 
endeavoring not to prejudge a matter prematurely, but, eventually, to propose an 
intervention or offer an analysis of a situation. 
1. Countertransference, Stereotyping, and Bias 
Paradoxically, one of the keys in taking a wider view of people and their pre-
dicaments is to first take a narrow view of oneself, specifically to notice and name 
one’s own reactions vis-a-vis another person.207 Those around us “evoke a range 
of conscious and unconscious reactions in us.”208 Therapists, like all people, have 
their own personal histories or tendencies that may be stirred up by their work 
with clients.209 The result for any one therapist is a flood of conscious and uncon-
scious reactions, needs, and wishes for herself or her clients.210 The field of psy-
chology calls these reactions countertransferences.211 Countertransferences will 
manifest as a range of reactions: affection, infatuation, hostility, ambivalence, 
dissociation, anxiety, etc.. A therapist’s education and experience prepares them 
with the knowledge that their attitude toward a client can affect the alliance with 
a client, and in turn, the treatment outcome.212 It is relatively easy, therefore, to 
see how negative countertransferences can become problematic.213 
However, it is also easy to overlook how a positive countertransference to a cli-
ent can become problematic if that countertransference goes unnoticed and 
unchecked.214 Perceiving sameness with a client can make it easy to feel a 
207. “Being a clinician on any level requires courage in managing the emotional land-mines that can 
develop when there is a parallel between internalized views, which are so intricately intertwined. As we 
unravel the tapestry of our patients’ lives, we must simultaneously unravel the tapestries of our own, 
mending as we go along to assure that our clients are best served by whole people, willing to be real in 
the process, and willing to take the risk to walk with them through their experiences.” See Chapman, 
supra note 205, at 227. 
208. A clinician’s needs and wishes may be informed by one’s own personal history, or by one’s 
understanding of their client, or general tendencies that an advocate has about a range of clients (i.e., 
being drawn to, or repelled by a certain client base). See Walsh, supra note 205, at 129–30. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 130–33; see also MICHAEL J. TANSEY & WALTER F. BURKE, UNDERSTANDING 
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE: FROM PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION TO EMPATHY 10 (1989). 
211. Walsh, supra note 205, at 131. To understand countertransferences, one must first understand 
the concept of transferences. Transferences refer generally to a client’s reactions to a therapeutic 
“other.” Transferences were originally defined as “a client’s projection of feelings, thoughts, and wishes 
onto the therapist, who comes to represent a person from the client’s past.” Countertransferences, in 
turn, originally described a therapist’s conscious and unconscious reactions to a transference (a reaction 
to a reaction, if you will). Id. at 130. 
212. Rebecca Linn-Walton & Manoj Pardasani, Dislikable Clients or Countertransference: A 
Clinician’s Perspective, 33(1) CLINIC SUPERVISION 100, 101 (2014). 
213. Perhaps you find the client tedious or provoking. It is difficult to lean into the relationship and 
establish a therapeutic alliance in that case. This lack of alliance, in turn, makes it hard to learn about the 
client. 
214. See Substance Abuse Treatment for Persons with Child Abuse and Neglect Issues, Treatment 
Improvement Protocol (TIP) Series, No. 36., CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT (last visited May 
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15, 2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64902 (stating counselor “loses her objectivity and 
becomes overwhelmed, angry, or bereft when hearing a client’s story.”). 
215. See Linn-Walton & Pardasani, supra note 212, at 101. See also EXAMINED LIFE, at 24:30 
(Zeitgeist Films 2010) (Kwame Anthony Appiah, a philosopher, discusses the challenge of connecting 
to and caring for other people: “yeah, we love everyone, but we want them to become like us to love 
them properly.”). 
216. See CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 214 (discussing “many counselors’ 
earnest desire to help, there is a danger of over interpreting nonspecific sequelae”). 
217. Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 41 (2001). Another source of affinity with a client is the tendency to become aligned with a client’s 
cause. While this buy-in can be positive for rapport building and stamina within a difficult case, it 
sometimes creates a trap for a therapist. “My poor client!” can turn into “my victimized/helpless/ 
blameless client,” who the counselor feels emotionally bonded to in some way. See Batt-Rawden et al., 
infra note 281, at 1171 (arguing that an important aspect of empathy is “‘detached concern,’ or the 
ability of one individual to understand the experiences of another without invoking a personal emotional 
response”). 
218. Laurence Bennett Green, The Value of Hate in the Countertransference, 34(2) CLINICAL SOC. 
WORK J. 187, 190 (2006). 
219. See Bryant, supra note 217, at 68. 
220. See Green, supra note 218, at 197; STEELE, supra note 95; Meytal Nasie et al., Overcoming the 
Barrier of Narrative Adherence in Conflicts Through Awareness of the Psychological Bias of Naı̈ve 
Realism, 40 (11) PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1543 (2014). 
221. See e.g., Sidney Coren, Mr. Trump: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Patient- 
Aggressor, 74 J. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 734, 735 (2018) (reconciling difference in opinion on Trump); ELLIOT 
ARONSON & CAROL TAVRIS, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH 
BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 124 (2007). 
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connection to the client.215 The easy or pleasant feelings that flow from the per-
ceived connection carry a risk that the counselor over-identifies with the client. A 
counselor may assume her own assessment of a given situation is naturally the 
same as the client’s, which in turn, forecloses curiosity about the client’s own 
assessment and observations.216 A focus on sameness wrongly denies the reality 
that “culture is enough of an abstraction that people can be part of the same cul-
ture, yet make different decisions in the particular.”217 Where the therapist feels 
similar to her client, or bonded to her client, there is a risk that if the client acts in 
a way that is discordant with the assumed course of conduct, the client violates 
some protocol they did not even know they were subject to. They may step out of 
the role of similarity with the therapist by acting very differently than her, or they 
may suddenly act out of character for someone who the therapist has type-cast.218 
When a client acts in a way that is unfamiliar to their therapist or the therapist 
perceives difference between themselves and the client, other countertransference 
risks are present. Where counselors perceive themselves as different from their 
client, there is an increased risk that they will be blind to certain aspects of the cli-
ent’s story or identity, or that they will interpret something in a manner consistent 
with a patent or latent bias against the perceived difference.219 There is also a 
tendency to juxtapose differences against one’s own experiences in a way that 
favors one’s own self as having the correct or natural orientation.220 The other 
identities or behaviors become just that: the other, or a deviation. And unsurpris-
ingly, judgement is often quickly on the heels of noticing otherness.221 
Therapists have long noted that their “countertransference[s] may coincide 
with [racial] stereotypes that delay the analysis [of the client’s needs].”222 
Similarly, the profession has wrangled with countertransferences based on a cli-
ent’s racist transferences, acknowledging how fraught they are and how threaten-
ing to a therapeutic alliance.223 For decades, therapists have acknowledged the 
therapeutic value in exploring racial tensions and the attendant transferences and 
countertransferences.224 This is in contrast to the ways in which other professions 
seem to insist on colorblindness as the gold standard of interacting with others. 
During law school, when students are taught to “think like a lawyer” (because of 
course there is only one type of lawyer to be and he thinks one way), seminal 
cases in constitutional law, tort, civil procedure, and property are trotted out in 
case books with little to no discussion of the race or gender of the litigant most 
affected by the case.225
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Taught as a seminal case for school 
equality and for consideration of the Equal Protection Clause, classes do not necessarily go on to 
consider how implementation came at great risk to black communities, nor how the decision resulted in 
the dismissal or forced resignation of legions of black teachers and administrators. See Derrick A. Bell, 
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 
YALE L. J. 470, 471 (1976) (discussing civil rights lawyers’ determination to implement Brown with 
school desegregation via busing and other dislocating methods despite “[t]his stance involv[ing] great 
risk for clients whose educational interest may no longer accord with the integration ideals of their 
attorneys.”); Madeline Will, 65 Years After “Brown v. Board,” Where are All the Black Educators?, ED. 
WEEK (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/14/65-years-after-brown-v-board- 
where.html. 
 The law, its doctrine, and its practice are often presented 
as colorblind or raceless.226 
Bound up in the discussion of how our minds make sense of others are the 
topics of unconscious biases generally and stereotypes specifically. Bias and ster-
eotypes can be understood as “cognitive shortcuts.”227 Our minds create catego-
ries and classifications to make sense of the enormous amount and variation of 
data before it.228 Stereotyping involves ascribing characteristics and behaviors to  
222. See Judith C. White, The Impact of Race and Ethnicity on Transference and 
Countertransference in Combined Individual/Group Therapy, 18 GROUP 89, 97 (1994) (offering the 
following example: “[a white Jewish client] denying prejudicial feelings toward the therapist 
corresponded to the therapist’s wish to perceive her as good and accepting of the therapist’s blackness 
[counter-transference]. The ethnic stereotype of Jews as being more accepting of blacks fostered a sense 
of false closeness with the therapist and interfered with [the therapist’s] analysis of [the client’s] need to 
be accepting [as it played into the client’s presenting problem, namely her unwillingness to assert her 
own needs, “her passivity and her masochism”] . . .”). 
223. Chapman, supra note 205, at 226 (stating “[m]y thoughts were of controlling my own rage. [The 
client] conveyed a feeling . . . of my incompetence, and his being unsure of my efficacy, all hanging on 
my being Black. It hit too close to home. . . I did not want to treat him. I was tired. I wanted to withdraw 
and I was relieved when the session ended.”). 
224. See, e.g., Janice E. Ruffin, RACISM as Countertransference in Psychotherapy Groups, 11 
PERSP. IN PSYCHIATRIC CARE 172, 178 (1973). 
225.
226. Margaret M. Russell, Beyond “Sellouts” and “Race Cards:” Black Attorneys and the 
Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 768 (1997). 
227. Malin & Biernat, supra note 103, at 176. 
228. Id.; ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221. 
2020] THE UNEXAMINED LIFE 597 
members of a given classification category.229 The problem is that stereotypes 
“bias[] in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, retention, 
and recall of information about other people.”230 
So, we can just be good people and not stereotype, right? Unfortunately, ster-
eotyping is not just a habit of people with known prejudice: it is often subcon-
scious.231 Stereotypes are “cognitive rather than motivational.”232 Many biases, 
particularly those based on race, class, or gender, are likely to be “the implicit, 
unconscious ways in which our own cultural heritages . . . influence our world 
view and our deep-seated assumptions about how the world works.”233 
Understanding the role that their own attitudes, opinions, and beliefs have on 
them helps therapists listen as closely as possible to their client, as opposed to lis-
tening through a filter of a “person prototype” or “social schema[].”234 
Professional training for therapists is designed to make the unconscious con-
scious, particularly around issues of diversity and identity. These concepts seem 
particularly important for judges who will wrangle with the notion of “mothers” 
and “mothering”. Mothers, after all, have a strong public prototype and yet are 
acutely personal and contextual to one’s own experience with mothers and cul-
tural notions of mothering.235 
2. Myside Bias and Cognitive Dissonance 
Bias is not just an issue of first impression— such as perceiving people initially 
vis a vis a prototype or opinion.236 Instead, it infects ongoing considerations of 
people and analysis problems due to a phenomenon called “myside bias.” 
Therapists’ attention to their own attitudes, opinions, and beliefs is also helpful, 
229. Malin & Biernat, supra note 103, at 176. 
230. See Krieger, supra note 7, at 1188. 
231. Id. at 1161; Malin & Biernat, supra note 103, at 177. 
232. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1194. 
233. Paul R. Tremblay & Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Heuristics and Biases, in THE 
AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 51 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007). 
234. See Krieger, supra note 7, at 1202–04; see also Chapman, supra note 205, at 222–23 (attention 
to countertransferences asks therapists to notice what impressions their clients make on them and what 
are the varied explanations for their reactions to their clients.) “It is through transference that we learn 
the most about the unconscious processes of our patients and their needs. They enter the treatment room, 
a special and private space, and fill it with their lives. The family and social dramas emerge in that room, 
that space. But the therapist is there as well, providing a screen for the viewing of this live production. 
One aspect of this screening is the content of the material itself; the other is the nature of the screen and 
the ability to show what is projected. Ideally, the screen displays without distortion. Unlike the 
screening room, however, there is a dynamic between the production and screen that bears on the 
treatment. Being human, both the producer of the material and the screen have distortions. The working- 
through process of these distortions is what leads to the change. The distortions in content we call 
transference, and in the screen the countertransference.” See id. at 226. 
235. See Carpenter & Austin, supra note 144, at 661 (“In contrast to the motherhood myth that 
asserts its own naturalness, we recognize motherhood as a culturally and historically specific set of 
discursive practices, a lived normativity, shot through with the discourses of child development, 
psychology, education, religion and spirituality, and medicine.”). 
236. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1188–91. 
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indeed critical, in making sure that therapists are thinking rationally as they 
undertake ongoing evaluation of issues, quandaries, or crises before them.237 The 
studies that identified and named myside bias found that people not only evaluate 
evidence, but also generate subsequent evidence and test hypotheses “in a manner 
biased toward their own prior beliefs, opinions, and attitudes.”238 Myside bias, 
then, is a cognitive deficit to rational thinking, because “critical thinkers should 
be able to decouple their prior beliefs and opinions from the evaluation of evi-
dence and arguments.”239 
A related concept is cognitive dissonance. Our cognitions are our thoughts, 
which are basically a bundle of our attitudes, opinions, and beliefs. Cognitive dis-
sonance, in simplest terms, refers to the tension someone experiences when two 
cognitions are in competition with one another.240 During their practice and 
research, therapists are likely to hear a great many narratives and make a great 
number of observations that do not align with their understanding of the world or 
their expectations. Therapists are taught to consider that their reactions to narra-
tives and observations may well have to do with the cognitive dissonance they 
are experiencing and the symphony of defense mechanisms and confirmation 
biases that may follow.241 
See, e.g., Paula J. Britton, Teaching Tip Sheet: Counselor Attitude Bias, APA (accessed Feb. 13, 
2020), https://www.apa.org/pi/aids/resources/education/counselor-bias (discussing lessons from the 
HIV/AIDS crisis about counselor bias toward patients). 
The central premise of cognitive dissonance is that humans crave consistency 
and have internalized this longing.242 
Ronald L. Jackson, Cognitive Dissonance Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IDENTITY, SAGE 
PUBLICATIONS (2010), https://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.credoreference. 
com/content/entry/sageidentity/cognitive_dissonance_theory/0?institutionId=702. 
When a need for consistency is thwarted by 
a “clash” between two cognitions, or between cognition and action, one looks for 
ways to reduce the discomfort being experienced.243 The mental gymnastics 
required to restore a sense of psychic order is done reflectively and is not neces-
sarily grounded in logical thinking.244 Cognitive dissonance often invites the per-
son experiencing it to look around for other explanations that will reduce the 
tension between the two competing cognitions. One approach is to recruit another 
belief, or, alternatively, to try to talk oneself out of, or soften, one of the compet-
ing positions.245 
237. Keith E. Stanovich et al., Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and Intelligence, 22 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 259, 263 (2013) (juxtaposing rational thinking with intelligent thinking). 
238. See id. at 259; see also Transcript of Record, Day 2, supra note 89, at 109. 
239. Stanovich et al., supra note 237, at 259. 
240. ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221, at 13. 
241.
242.
243. See id. 
244. See id. 
245. See generally Avidit Acharya et al., Explaining Attitudes from Behavior: A Cognitive 
Dissonance Approach, 80 J. OF POL. 400, 411 (2018). A classic example is the smoker who knows 
smoking is harmful (first cognition), but likes to smoke (competing cognition). The smoker could apply 
logic to the topic of smoking: note her ambivalence on the subject and admit plainly to be acting in a 
manner inconsistent with her belief. Alternatively, one approach is to recruit another belief: if I try to 
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Confirmation biases—such as myside bias—can be seen as an elaborate and 
often subconscious attempt to avoid cognitive dissonance.246 With confirmation 
bias, an individual does not perceive or engage with conflicting information and 
instead only takes on information that conforms with existing beliefs.247 In so 
doing, one can avoid any dissonance that new and conflicting observations or 
knowledge might possibly create.248 In contrast to tenets of critical thinking, 
myside bias directs researchers’ curiosity in the first instance, and subsequently, 
their perception as they proceed in a manner that leads them to facts that support, 
rather than challenge, an assumed position. As such, psychosocial science litera-
ture is replete with studies and analysis of bias. Such research alongside the cur-
ricular commitment to diversity and inclusion offerings reflect the notion that: 
This is where science comes in. It doesn’t purge us of bias. But it 
extends what we can see and understand, while constraining 
bias. . .The constant back and forth between ideas and research results 
hammers away at bias, and just as important often reveals aspects of 
reality that surpass our original ideas and insights.249 
quit smoking, I will gain weight. Or, the smoker can try to talk herself out of, or soften, one of the 
competing positions: the risks of smoking are overstated. See id. 
246. ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221. 
247. Acharya et al., supra note 245, at 409. 
248. Defense mechanisms are another concept used to understand how people manage the anxiety 
prompted by beliefs or experiences. See Jesse A. Metzger, Adaptive Defense Mechanisms: Function and 
Transcendence, 70 J. OF CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 478, 488 (2014). Defense mechanisms are common— 
indeed, sometimes psychically useful— when one is confronted with stressful or confusing stimuli. Id. 
These include “disavowal” or “distortion/misattribution” defense mechanisms. Id. Maladaptive defense 
mechanisms, however, “deny or distort sources of conflict.” Id. Constant use of maladaptive defense 
mechanisms could become pathological; for example, somebody continually projecting their feelings of 
upset onto someone else, denying the true nature of the stressful stimulus, or rationalizing away poor 
choices. See Faramarzi et al., The Role of Psychiatric Symptoms, Alexithymia, and Maladaptive 
Defenses in Patients with Functional Dyspepsia, 66 INDIAN J. OF MED. SCI. 40 (2012). When 
maladaptive defense mechanisms turn into closely held, self-affirming beliefs or practices, one is then 
primed to confirm them via confirmation biases. See Geoffrey D. Munro & Jessica A. Stanbury, The 
Dark Side of Self-Affirmation: Confirmation Bias and Illusory Correlation in Response to Threatening 
Information, 35(9) PERS. AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1143, 1144, 1153 (2009). Consider another 
example: an individual addicted to painkillers finds herself in a romantic relationship that is suffering 
under the attendant consequences of addiction, e.g. the weight of lies, increased frequency of careless 
oversights, redirection of time and resources to support the addiction. To internalize the reality of the 
hardship would be to admit painful truths: loss of control over the addiction, blame, shame, etc. Id. To 
avoid the ego-threatening nature of these truths, and to deal with the mounting anxiety that they bring, 
our subject begins to project her feelings or impulses onto her romantic other. Id. Her partner is 
unreliable; her partner is lying; her partner is not invested in the relationship. Having projected her 
insecurities about her own reliability, honesty, and control onto her partner, she now sees evidence of 
her belief everywhere—in an unreturned email, a late night at work, a careless comment, etc. Id. 
Disbelieving a threatening health report because of minor spelling errors or completely discrediting a 
disliked politician’s argument because of a mispronounced word are examples of unfair analyses that 
could result in poor judgments. In these examples, a person who was not motivated to discredit the 
information would likely forgive these minor mistakes and evaluate the information more objectively. 
Id. 
249. STEELE, supra note 95. 
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Therapists’ initial schooling, in conjunction with continuing education initia-
tives and in-service trainings during their work life, as well as the use of supervi-
sion and peer participation in case work (discussed in more detail below), offer 
routine opportunities for therapists to unearth personal beliefs and attitudes 
towards others and to confront both personal and studied biases. Developing con-
trol over one’s self, and attention to a nuanced sense of other, is the foundation 
from which therapists listen to, and learn about, their clients. This controlled and 
careful listening is, in turn, the precursor to proposing any intervention in the cli-
ents’ lives. This all stands in stark contrast to a legal fact finder being invited to 
draw on their own “common sense and experience of life” when deciding 
whether or how strongly to credit evidence.250 
B. COURTROOMS 
In contrast to the practices and research surrounding counseling fields, the 
practices and procedures in litigation, particularly family law litigation in front of 
a judicial fact finder, are a breeding ground for inaccurate understandings and 
misattributions.251 A brief comparison of jury and bench trials demonstrates how 
judicial decisions pose a distinct risk. But first, one should note that in any trial— 
whether a jury or a bench trial—litigants must lay out the narratives of their lives. 
Yet in courtrooms, those narratives are constrained by the anxiety of court and 
rules of procedure and evidence.252 Context and backstory can be difficult to 
explore while attending to rules of evidence.253 Moreover, the vast majority of lit-
igants in family court are unable to afford legal representation and must proceed 
pro se. The lack of legal training often further muddies the presentation of evi-
dence and leads to a more active role of the judicial official to determine how and 
what facts are introduced; meanwhile, important arguments at law can go 
unraised.254 
Jury trials, at least, are often choreographed with some precision and attention 
to time management. Litigators also probe jurors in voir dire concerning their  
250. See CRIM. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 15. 
251. See Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 900; see, e.g., INSTRUCTION 2.120, CREDIBILITY OF A 
WITNESS, MASS. MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, (9th ed. March 2019). 
252. Gutheil et al., supra note 6, at 11. 
253. Compare Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964) with Johnson v. United States, 
683 A.2d 1087 (D.C. 1996) and Tolliver v. United States, 468 A.2d 958, 960 (D.C. 1983) (establishing 
the prior bad act rule in the District of Columbia in which evidence of prior crimes is inadmissible to 
show “propensity” but admissible if the evidence of the other crime is “direct and substantial” proof of 
the current crime). 
254. Brief for Respondent at 41, Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 1980 WL 340034, *41-42 (stating 
“one final point needs to be made with regard to Petitioner’s claim that because of her lack of 
representation, improper, incompetent and inadmissible evidence was elicited against her, and that 
defenses available to her went unnoticed. . .As with the refusal of the judge to grant a delay . . . she could 
have preserved many of her exceptions to these alleged errors in the hearing in her Record on Appeal, 
and assigned them as error to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Her failure to do so constituted an 
abandonment of these claims under the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.”). 
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experiences and impressions, all meant to unearth bias.255 
See, e.g., William S. Friedlander & Alexandra Rudolph, The Bias Beneath: Uncovering Juror 
Bias in Sexual Assault Cases, THE PLAINTIFF MAGAZINE (June 2010), https://www.plaintiffmagazine. 
com/recent-issues/item/the-bias-beneath-uncovering-juror-bias-in-sexual-assault-cases (offering “trade 
magazine”-style tips for prosecutors for jury voir dire in sexual assault cases). 
Rules of evidence are 
designed to keep distracting evidence away from the fact finder; and arguments 
about, for example, admissibility or relevance are conducted out of the jury’s 
hearing.256 And while juries may place their own worldview and experiences at 
the epicenter of the scene playing out before them,257 jury instructions instruct 
jurors to set aside personal sympathies.258 Finally, while a juror will separate truth 
from fiction by juxtaposing what they are observing (in their mind’s eye after a 
witness’ telling) with their own lived experience, the hope bound up in the model 
of group deliberation is that multiple members will recall more facts than any one 
individual and that multiple members will bring additional lived experiences into 
the consideration of those facts.259 
Guthrie et al., supra note 256, at 827. There is notable systemic racism present in decisions 
about who is able to process facts in an unbiased way through the lens of their lived experiences and 
what lived experiences matter. See, e.g., Maria Cramer, Man Appeals Conviction After Dismissal of 
Potential Juror Who Said System is Rigged Against Black Men, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 20, 2018), https:// 
www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/09/19/man-appeals-conviction-after-dismissal-potential-juror-who- 
said-system-rigged-against-black-men/wozpUS1g6f4L5dYDbQBRII/story.html. 
Collectively, these rules aim to function as 
guardrails to dilute the power of any one juror’s bias, bolstering more empathetic 
understanding of the litigant and thus, a more just and balanced outcome. 
In contrast, custody cases are handled by judges. In a bench trial, there is no 
mechanism akin to voir dire to correct for or measure the potential bias of a judi-
cial official. Moreover, the trial is often presented in the time crunch of busy 
courts or trotted out over a series of disjointed hearing dates.260 Procedures 
around raising and arguing evidentiary issues outside of the fact finder’s hearing 
are impossible, as the fact finder and decider of issues of law are one in the 
same.261 The observer-judge alone is left to recall facts and scrutinize them based 
on her own individual worldview; her doing so is not mitigated or interrogated by 
other fact finders. In this troubling context, having arrived at her individual sense 
of fact and truth, the observer-judge alone then attaches value judgements to the 
facts. 
Given this context of judicial decision making, it is particularly troubling that 
caution against bias generally, and myside bias specifically, is markedly wanting 
255.
256. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780–81 n.12–16, 827 
(2001) (citing studies in tort law, for example, which suggest that jurors’ cognitive shortcuts may lead 
them to incoherent or illogical conclusions). 
257. See Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 900. 
258. See, e.g., INSTRUCTION 2.120, n.3, FUNCTION OF THE JURY: SYMPATHY, MASS. MODEL CRIM. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 10th ed. (revised March 2019) (“In many criminal cases there is an element of 
sympathy which surrounds the trial. You may not permit sympathy to affect your verdict(s).”). 
259.
260. Larissa MacFarquhar, When Should a Child Be Taken from His Parents? In Family Court, 
Judges Must Decide Whether the Risks at Home Outweigh the Risks of Separating a Family, THE NEW 
YORKER (July 31, 2017), at 13. 
261. Guthrie et al., supra note 256, at 780–81, 827. 
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in legal literature and andragogy.262 Some might even argue that the law itself is 
committed to confirming the opinions and beliefs of a privileged set: 
The problem is that not all positioned perspectives are equally valued, 
equally heard, or equally included. From the perspective of critical 
race theory, some positions have historically been oppressed, dis-
torted, ignored, silenced, destroyed, appropriated, commodified, and 
marginalized—and all of this, not accidentally.263 
Certainly, those centered at the intersection of family law and critical legal 
theory would not argue with this premise. Consider, for example, that there is no 
“lack of cases involving race matters,” and yet the courts seemingly insist on a 
single notion of the “institution of the family,” and do so through demonstrable 
“reluctance or unwillingness to acknowledge the impact that racial bias or in-
equality played in a particular family-related case.264 
Without some insight into their own biases, judges are likely to engage in 
myside bias thinking as they listen to evidence in the first instance and then 
endeavor to make sense of that evidence in the next. Reform, therefore, should 
not only include introducing self-identity work and cultural humility into judicial 
training, but also opportunities and support for judges to engage in a reflective 
process as they carry out their work.265 Changes to legal rules to introduce and 
enforce procedural slow-downs will create greater opportunities to raise judicial 
consciousness, a necessary trade-off for trial expediency. Lastly, litigators must 
intentionally consider bias when fashioning their case theories and presenting 
evidence and argument. 
1. Training and Support 
Studies confirming judicial bias abound, and there has been some limited mo-
mentum in criminal courts to engage with that research and require the judiciary 
262. See, e.g., Lorenzo Bowman et al., The Exclusion of Race from Mandated Continuing Legal 
Education, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 229 (arguing it should be part of continuing education); 
Francisco Valdes, Insisting on Critical Theory in Legal Education: Making Do While Making Waves, 12 
BERK. LA RAZA L. J 137 (calling for critical theory education and defining critical theory as “at bottom, 
the effort to pierce conventional wisdom through an interrogation of normalized notions, and to arrive at 
a transcendental understanding of social constructions and realities—a more accurate understanding of 
how and why something is the way it is in ways that transcend the premises, imperatives and limitations 
of conventional explanations about dominant social arrangements. Critical theory is the project that 
enables substantive analysis of the personal and particular at structural and systemic levels. It is the 
process that makes patterns out of particularities.”). 
263. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 80, at 901. 
264. R.A. Lenhardtal, The Color of Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2071, 2093 (2017) (“Not 
insignificantly, this sidelining of race in family law scholarship just described relates to a pervasive 
‘normative ideology of racial nonrecognition’ more often associated with judicial cases outside of 
family law.”). 
265. See Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit Bias?, 54 THE JUDGES’ JOURNAL 21 
(2015). 
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to attend to the realities of their bias.266 
See e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 853 n.5; Chris Guthrie et al., supra note 256, at 780–81 
n.12–16, 827. Indeed, part of a 2016 proposal by Massachusetts courts to combat bias included a 
proposal to open six legal help centers. See Shira Schoenberg, Massachusetts Courts to Examine Racial 
Disparities in Imprisonment Rates, MASSLIVE (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.masslive.com/politics/2016/ 
10/mass_courts_to_examine_dispari.html. 
It is time that other judges receive this 
education as well and that the education be specific to the subject matter over 
which they are presiding. Family courts should know, for example, about the 
recent study of family court judges that found that judges were more influenced 
by gender in custody cases than lay people were.267 Not surprisingly, the tendency 
to discriminate in favor of mothers and against fathers in custody arrangements 
tracked with judges’ responses to questions about gender-role ideologies: “[t]he 
more they supported traditional gender roles for men and women, the more par-
enting time they gave to the mother in the case.”268 
Judicial training cannot assume a judge knows her own preferences and predi-
lections; rather, there must be intentional efforts to excavate that sense of self 
from the subconscious. Self-identity work is critical, foundational work to 
unearthing how judges feel vis a vis the identity of another; for example, what 
meaning do they attribute to the sameness or difference between themselves and 
litigants?269 Judges need to name who they believe themselves to be and what 
meanings they attribute to that identity. In social work and psychology settings, 
this is done at the curricular level during schooling. It is reinforced in training of 
junior clinicians and in supervision of clinicians throughout their careers. 
Because we cannot wait for an overhaul of the American legal education system, 
one can look instead to trainings within the field, such as those endorsed by the 
Anti-Defamation League, to inspire judicial reform.270 
See ADL Applauds Department of Justice Commitment to Implicit Bias Training, ANTI- 
DEFAMATION LEAGUE (June 27, 2016), https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-applauds-department- 
of-justice-commitment-to-implicit-bias-training. 
Understanding one’s own self is critical for stopping the riptide effect that 
one’s emotional reaction to another can inspire. The notion of “us” is a “funda-
mental social category in the brain’s organizing system.”271 It is not difficult to 
appreciate how “us” would be a favored category, but two social scientists put it 
this way: “[w]ithout feeling attached to groups that give our lives meaning, iden-
tity and purpose, we would suffer the intolerable sensation that we are loose mar-
bles floating in a random universe.”272 When our sense of identity is not 
threatened, we can maintain our bond to our own social group while maintaining 
tolerance for other categories of people—the “them” of the “us and them”  
266.
267. See Miller, supra note 107 (describing study in which judges awarded mothers half (.5) a day 
more time on average than they awarded fathers, whereas using the same fact patterns, lay subjects only 
awarded mothers .15 more days). 
268. Id. 
269. ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221, at 58–60. 
270.
271. ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221, at 58. 
272. Id. 
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dichotomy.273 In socially, emotionally fraught environments, it feels particularly 
intolerable to be disoriented from a sense of a connected, grounded self, and so 
our brains activate the biased reasoning that is hanging out in our blind spots.274 
We move away from curiosity about the behaviors and choices of other people, 
and rely instead on a knee-jerk, gut sense that “we have the human qualities of 
intelligence and deep emotions. . . They don’t know the meaning of love, shame, 
grief, or remorse.”275 By examining their own lives and selves, judges will be bet-
ter situated to examine the lives of others in a less biased way.276 
Judges must comb through a litany of strife, anger, and sadness for facts. 
Worryingly, people who are in crisis or otherwise experiencing heightened inter-
personal or emotional circumstances, provoke more acute reactions in those who 
work with them.277 Those representing themselves pro se, like many family court 
litigants, do not have someone who can shield them from the intensity of the other 
party or the court experience, or help them curate and moderate a message for the 
judge. This makes it more likely that the judge receives uncensored, emotive ma-
terial from a pro se litigant which, in turn, provokes a bigger reaction in the 
judge.278 Therefore, beyond engaging in foundational self-identity work, judges 
should be trained about the reality of their emotional reactions to litigants. 
Judges, whether they are tuned into it or not, react to litigants: they have sym-
pathy or fondness for some, they feel angry or annoyed by others. It can be a chal-
lenging or unfamiliar notion to ask professionals outside of counseling fields to 
notice, let alone credit, emotional content.279 However, it is important that judges 
gain the insight to notice their reactions in the first instance, and then have the 
courage and curiosity to reflect on it thereafter.280 Emotional intelligence is 
learned; it is not an innate skill.281 Judges can be taught to notice when they have  
273. Id. at 59. 
274. Id.; see also Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 Yale L.J. 1559, 1560 (1989) 
(describing “incessant, often gratuitous and subtle offenses,” which can be seen as a manifestation of the 
bias that exists in “blind spots”). 
275. ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221, at 59. 
276. Id. 
277. See Linn-Walton & Pardasani, supra note 212; Walsh, supra note 205, at 130; TANSEY & 
BURKE, supra note 210, at 77. 
278. See Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (2012) (discussing lawyer and 
litigant behaviors that are commonly met with judicial anger, including perceived lies, perceived 
defiance of judicial authority, perceived insults, and perceived incompetence). 
279. See Joan Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal 
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1355 (1993); 
Marjorie Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interferences in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 
CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 278-79 (1999). 
280. Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud initially referred to countertransferences as “blind spots.” See 
Joseph Sandler, Countertransference and Role-Responsiveness, 3 INT’L REV. OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 43, 
43 (1976). 
281. See Samantha A. Batt-Rawden et al., Teaching Empathy to Medical Students: An Updated, 
Systemic Review, 88 ACAD. MED. 1171, 1173 (2013); Denise Panosky & Desiree Diaz, Teaching Caring 
and Empathy Through Simulation, 13 INT’L J. FOR HUM. CARING 44, 44 (2009). 
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an affinity or aversion toward litigants.282 From this starting point, they can learn 
to be critical about the meaning they ascribe to their observations and feelings 
and think critically about any action they take.283 
Self-identity work and unearthing bias is work that inescapably leaves one 
feeling disoriented and vulnerable,284 but an element of humility is a good thing. 
Studies show that the more confidence one has, the less likely one is to admit mis-
takes.285 Judges are often told they deserve to judge because their success or im-
portance secured them the opportunity. Depending on the jurisdiction, judges are 
voted into the position or hand selected and groomed for their appointments. This 
sense of deserving or accomplishment can all too readily be conflated into a belief 
that they are good at the job of judging.286 Maladaptive defense mechanisms are 
often right on the heels of such conviction—for example, a judge rationalizing a 
prior holding on a motion to reconsider, as opposed to endeavoring to critically 
rethink their ruling, or a judge dissociating from the stress of the position or the 
emotionally combustible case before them and rushing to a mechanical, cookie- 
cutter decision.287 There is room in the way we train and support judges’ work to 
inspire humility and some healthy uncertainty in order to thwart bias.288 
While the feelings of vulnerability are key to bias training and professional 
growth, it can make for tough work. When we acknowledge and wrangle with 
our own racism, bias around gender, or heteronormativity, our defense mecha-
nisms kick in to protect us from uncomfortable worry that we are not as good and 
decent a person as we believed ourselves to be.289 To offset the difficulties in 
282. Indeed, it is worth asking judges to explore their bias during the recruitment and screening of 
judges in jurisdictions where judges are vetted by a committee. One could see using any of the 
instruments described in the studies cited here, or others that could be coded and analyzed by an 
interdisciplinary team. Or, perhaps social workers and psychologists could propose screening questions 
for interviews or participate on selection committees. 
283. We do this with legal training in clinics. See Bryant, supra note 217, at 43–44; White, supra 
note 222; Silver, supra note 279, at 260 (“In order to do our work well, we must be in touch with what 
we are feeling—and why”); Chapman, supra note 205. Relatedly, this noticing of self and comparing 
oneself to the other also serves a final prophylactic purpose: it can help clinicians connect meaningfully 
to all clients and help them weather difficult connections with tough clients. See Stein-Parbury 
discussion of empathy, supra note 99. See also Linn-Walton & Pardasani, supra note 212 (“’[o]ne of the 
recurring themes that encapsulated positive coping skills employed by clinicians when working with 
‘dislikable’ clients was the utilization of empathy.’”). 
284. See generally ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR WHITE PEOPLE TO 
TALK ABOUT RACISM (2018). 
285. ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221, at 30. 
286. Guthrie et al., supra note 256, at 814 (discussing the presence of egocentric bias in judges); but 
see Miller, supra note 107 (finding judges are more influenced by gender in custody cases than lay 
people). 
287. Guthrie et al., supra note 256, at 814; see also Munro & Stanbury, supra note 248, at 1144, 1153. 
288. ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221, at 22; Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 898 (“[O]ur 
recommendation here is that [Supreme Court] judges throttle back. In place of the muscular self- 
confidence that now dominates opinion writing, we propose an idiom of aporia in which judges 
acknowledge the difficulty of the controversies before them.”). 
289. Lawrence, supra note 9 (“Freudian theory states that the human mind defends itself against the 
discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with 
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clinical settings, therapists routinely meet in groups, called group supervision, to 
support one another’s work on self and on behalf of clients. Peer groups create an 
opportunity to expose and explore dilemmas in a contained environment.290 The 
sense of containment is fostered by the guiding principles to assume good inten-
tions of participants and to maintain one another’s confidentiality. The nature of 
group work creates a shared experience and can highlight the universality of cer-
tain experiences, which in turn, helps combat a sense of isolation or desperation 
that can accompany sitting with difficult feelings about difficult clients or scenar-
ios.291 Peer work could play a compelling role in judicial training; as shall be dis-
cussed in more detail below, it is also an important part of making unbiased 
decisions. 
2. Procedural Slow Down 
In addition to working with difficult content, family court judges work in a 
fast-paced, pressured environment: court calendars; various litigants and counsel 
streaming in and out of courtrooms all day; matters heard one after the other with 
parties stepping back and then forward again in a disjointed way—over the course 
of the weeks, months, or even years the case may take to play out. Stress distracts 
the brain and invites cognitive shortcuts that in turn provoke biased responses.292 
It is critical, therefore, to introduce procedures that invite deliberate consideration 
of evidence and directly engage with the concept of bias, so as to make the sub-
conscious conscious. 
One modest proposal is that family court judges be required to take matters 
under advisement. It would be logical in the face of controversy, particularly a 
controversy into which the judge has been newly invited, for the judge to be ten-
tative and cautious in rendering an opinion. Yet, studies demonstrate remarkable 
counterfactuals: As markers of the irrevocability or costliness of a decision 
increase, decision makers show an irrational spike in certainty, rather than 
remaining logically tentative.293 These studies are consistent with the judicial au-
dacity to believe that they can arbitrate a controversy from the bench, despite that 
controversy having paralyzed the most invested people and having been active 
for months or years in the lives of those interested parties prior to judicial 
involvement.294 A social psychologist might consider a rush to judgment a feature 
of “naı̈ve realism,” or the “inescapable conviction that we perceive objects and 
events clearly.”295 The theory of naı̈ve realism posits that humans assume that 
what the individual has learned is good or right.”); see generally DIANGELO, supra note 284, at Ch. 5 
(discussing the “good/bad binary” as “the most effective adaptation of racism”). 
290. Nava Arkin et al., A Group Supervision Model for Broadening Multi-Method Skills of Social 
Work Students, 18 SOC. WORK EDUC. 49, 50 (1999). 
291. Id. 
292. See ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221; Seamone, supra note 88, at 1027. 
293. ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221, at 22. 
294. See Kahan et al., supra note 14, at 898. 
295. ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221, at 42. 
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reasonable people will agree with a reasonable opinion; and further, that any 
opinion we hold is reasonable.296 When one’s own opinion reflects adherence to 
an in-group’s collective narrative, one is more susceptible to naı̈ve realism.297 
This speed and reflexiveness also helps the judge avoid the cognitive dissonance 
that might arise if they allowed competing cognitions to percolate. Rather than 
wrestle with the tensions between “I believe myself to be fair” and “I am about to 
upset a litigant,” or “I believe I must act” and “There is no clear answer here,” a 
knee-jerk fact finder can dispose of the issue quickly, recruiting whatever facts 
best serve her answer, or ignoring facts that would call her decision into ques-
tion.298 Faced with a difficult decision about how to apportion custodial time 
between two parents, it is psychologically more comfortable for a judge to state 
her opinion quickly and resolutely in keeping with dominant narratives and to dis-
miss counterfactuals as irrational and self-interested.299 
While taking matters under advisement might slow litigation and issuance of 
opinions, a requirement to take a matter under advisement would signal that a good 
decision is not one rendered quickly or absent consideration—and reconsideration— 
of the facts and arguments offered by the parties. This logic fuels arguments for 
access to counsel as well. Cases with attorneys tend to be litigated more robustly.300 
Leaving aside the reality that cases with attorneys are more likely to be negotiated or 
mediated outside of court, even in court they are more likely to include motion prac-
tice, discovery, and other pretrial steps that slow the pace of the case and put the mat-
ter before the court on multiple occasions and in varying postures.301 The procedural 
slowdown of taking a matter under advisement would not mimic these repeated 
appearances, but it would allow judges the opportunity to sit with a custodial matter 
on multiple and varying occasions. While there is always pressure for expedited pro-
cess to settle uncertainty in custodial arrangements, a decision more thoughtfully 
rendered after it has been taken under advisement may well inspire a sense of proce-
dural justice that would encourage acceptance and compliance, rather than the knee- 
jerk motions to modify and motions for contempt that are routinely filed following 
custody order.302 
Another powerful tool in making fact finders’ subconscious conscious would 
be a rule requiring judges to use an inventory of judicial bias in rendering their 
findings of facts and conclusions of law. In 2016, the Massachusetts judiciary 
launched an effort to understand why rates of imprisonment for black and Latino 
defendants was disproportionately higher than for white defendants.303 A key 
296. Nasie et al., supra note 220, at 1544. 
297. Id. 
298. See ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221; Acharya et al., supra note 245, at 409. 
299. See Nasie et al., supra note 220; ARONSON & TAVRIS, supra note 221. 
300. Indeed, part of the 2016 proposal by Massachusetts courts to combat bias included a proposal to 
open six legal help centers. See Schoenberg, supra note 266. 
301. Id. 
302. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 27 (1988). 
303. Id. 
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outcome of the study was the adoption in Step One, Chapter One, of the 
Massachusetts Sentencing Guidelines a Bias Check—Stop and Review Ten Best 
Practices. Accordingly, judges are asked to consider the following: 
Are there areas or decision points in which bias may be present? 
Should you allow more time because bias may be a concern? 
Have you avoided decisions under rushed, stressed, distracted, or pres-
sured circumstances? 
Have you taken special care when you must respond quickly to avoid 
making snap decisions? 
Have you critically reviewed your decision-making process before 
committing to a decision? 
Have you considered what evidence supports the conclusions you 
have drawn and how you should challenge unsupported assumptions? 
Ask yourself if your opinion of the defendant(s), victim(s), witness(es) 
or case would be different if the people belonged to different racial, 
ethnic, gender identity, sexual orientation or age groups? 
Have you taken notes on your decision-making process? 
Have you tracked your decision in this case in relation to other cases 
and examined your decisions for patterns of bias? 
Have you taken into account that in minority and poor neighborhoods 
deep police penetration may result in disproportionately high prosecu-
tion for certain offenses?304 
MASSACHUSETTS SENTENCING GUIDELINES, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/sentencing- 
guidelines-step-1-chapter-1. 
The use of inventories such as these invite a fact finder to take into account 
how they notice a litigant, or notice and articulate their own countertransfer-
ence.305 These inventories are also an intervention to stereotyping and myside 
bias. In prior studies, researchers have asked subjects to attempt an “executive 
override” of their prior-held beliefs and to “decouple” those beliefs from consid-
eration of presented facts and arguments.306 
Pat Croskerry et al., Cognitive Debiasing: Origins of Bias and Theory of Debiasing, 22 BMJ 
QUALITY & SAFETY 55 (2013), https://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/22/Suppl_2/ii58. 
These studies concluded that when 
you instruct people that there is a bias to avoid and suggest cognitive exercises to 
help avoid employing the bias, intelligent people are able to engage in rational— 
304.
305. See supra Section IV A (1). 
306.
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as opposed to biased—thinking.307 However, without this advance warning of 
bias and instructions to decouple the bias, even highly intelligent people are prone 
to engage in myside bias thinking, which is to say, “evaluate evidence, generate 
evidence, and test hypotheses in a manner biased toward their own prior opinions 
and attitudes.”308 These proposals should sound familiar, as we prime jurors in 
this way. Litigators engage through voir dire at jury selection, and warn jurors 
through instructions at trial on the issue of prejudice, biases, sympathies, etc. 
Time and time again, judges and attorneys name fear, prejudice, bias, and sympa-
thy as inapposite with a just verdict. These cautions should be embedded into 
practice with judges, too. 
Procedural slowdowns also provide the opportunity for judges to employ the 
group supervision or peer rounds discussed earlier. Group supervision or rounds 
share a motivation and theoretical approach with other proposals to debias judges. 
After their research confirmed implicit bias on the bench, Sheri Johnson et al. pro-
posed that courts audit judicial decisions to analyze the influence of bias on deci-
sion making and suggested favoring multi-judge panels.309 Both of these 
proposed reforms aim to invite colleagues into a judge’s decision making, either 
during the course of rendering a decision or at least after the fact, as a tool for 
honest reflection.310 
Johnson’s proposals, as well as the model of peer-to-peer supervision, are 
essentially attempts to approximate group deliberation. A group will discover and 
later recall more and different facts than a single person; and moreover a group of 
people, embodying a host of lived experiences, will make sense of the facts dif-
ferently than an individual deliberating alone.311 The benefits of group delibera-
tion as a debiasing mechanism are enhanced when there is diversity in the group; 
which in turn, speaks to the need to recruit and promote a diverse bench.312 
Similarly, judges could benefit from the peer-review system as found in the 
medical profession. Doctors engage their peers when they “round” on a case each 
day or when they perform morbidity and mortality assessments.313 In morbidity 
and mortality reviews, for example, the goal is to revisit errors to gain insight 
307. Id. 
308. Stanovich et al., supra note 237, at 559; Keith Stanovich & Richard West, On the Relative 
Independence of Thinking Biases and Cognitive Ability, 94 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 672, 690 (2008). 
309. Sheri Johnson et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1195, 1231 (2009) (discussing the imperative of having a diverse panel of judges). 
310. See Croskerry et al., supra note 306, at 55; Stanovich et al., supra note 237, at 559; Stanovich & 
West, supra note 308, at 690. 
311. See Guthrie, supra note 256, at 827; Johnson et al., supra note 309, at 1231. 
312. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making: Identifying Multiple 
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 600-01 
(2006). 
313. Eric Howell et al., Morbidity and Mortality Conference, Grand Rounds, and the ACGME’s 
Core Competencies, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1192 (2006); Sally Quilligan, Learning Clinical 
Communication on Ward-Rounds: An Ethnographic Study, 37 MED. TEACHER 168, 168 (2015) 
(describing rounds as a “key event” within a doctor’s routine, a site of important informal and 
interprofessional communication, and “par excellence a site for learning.”).  
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without blame or derision, and rounds generally aim to improve collaboration 
and input on a plan of care.314 Reflection on past decisions can help make sure 
that judges do not simply keep rolling forward with the same “type” of flawed de-
cision making.315 There is even room within judicial ethics in certain jurisdictions 
to have consultation with fellow judges during the trial judge’s decision mak-
ing.316 So while training and support structures are foundational, changes in the 
procedure or process of adjudicating can help judges deploy the skills that the 
training and support instill in them. 
3. Litigation Strategy 
Beyond curating procedures or rules that name bias or attempt to interrupt it, lit-
igators must keep the reality of bias front and center in their minds during case 
preparation and execution. Litigators know that judges have predilections and 
mannerisms best suited to certain cases and litigants. This is why litigators forum 
shop whenever possible, and it is also why, in courts with set judge assignments, 
litigators hold their breath to see who will be assigned to the courtrooms in which 
they most often appear. Certainly, one cannot declare in a closing statement: “Hey 
judge, I know you are hostile toward young unemployed black men, but . . .” One 
can, however, name a given bias: “We are invited to assume, your honor, that 
[Norman] is avoiding work because he does not want to provide financially for his 
child, but this conclusion tracks with an offensive stereotype that distracts from 
careful consideration of the evidence.”317 
Moreover, if a litigator takes the threat of bias seriously, they are not waiting 
until closing statements to rage against it. They curate a direct examination that 
belies it. In Norman’s case, for example, might he have been asked if he was 
avoiding more hours so as to avoid child support or, better yet, asked how he 
would feel if someone assumed that he was? In some cases, client voice may not 
be enough, and the use of an expert witness may be necessary for a case theory. 
In a parental discipline case such as Paulette’s, for example, an expert could have 
assisted by disputing the misconceptions and dismantling the prejudice around 
Paulette’s culturally more authoritarian parenting.318 Strategies such as these alert  
314. See, e.g., Kevin J. O’Leary et al., Structured Interdisciplinary Rounds in a Medical Teaching 
Unit, Health Care Reform, 171 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 678, 679 (2011). 
315. Isabelle Brocasa & Juan D. Carrillo, The Neurobiology of Opinions: Can Judges and Juries Be 
Impartial?, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 421, 423 (2013) (“decisionmakers will tend to form posteriors that 
confirm their priors and that are affected by the magnitude of their payoffs or preferences. . .these 
constraints make the order in which evidence is received critical. . . it is not the same to be exposed first 
to strong evidence a crime has been committed as it is to listen first to the childhood story of the 
criminal.”). 
316. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 2.9 cmt. 5. 
317. See DIANGELO, supra note 287, at 19-22 (demonstrating the importance of, and techniques for, 
calling out attitudes of prejudice and discriminatory actions, and situating us all in the reality of our 
racial socializations). 
318. Valentino et al., supra note 194, at 173-74. 
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the judge that there is a bias to avoid.319 In her closing, the attorney can remind 
the judge again, nudging her to decouple bias, and marshaling evidence and argu-
ment that support a different, unbiased cognition.320 
Of course, “[s]urmounting these challenges is undoubtedly difficult. After all, 
judges have the most intractable bias of all: the bias of believing they are without 
bias.”321 While no litigator alive likely shares the impression that judges are with-
out, they commonly underestimate the depth and impact of judicial bias or they 
think their abundance of facts and law will be sufficient to push through the bar-
rier of bias.322 But studies are clear that naming bias, asking that it be decoupled 
from the cognitive task, and then offering unbiased scripts, is the best formula for 
unbiased reasoning.323 
Unfortunately, these proposals are in tension with the reality in family court 
that many litigants are pro se, so the litigation strategies just described are not 
likely to be helpful to those litigants in combating bias and promoting cultural 
humility and positive regard. Nevertheless, there are other possible strategies. For 
example, the bar can help by making consistent and clear cases against racist, 
gendered, and heteronormative thinking that raises judicial consciousness, and by 
advocating for reforms as will be described below. Further, on a point that returns 
us to the topic of judicial training, judges themselves can take another lesson 
from therapists’ playbooks to learn how to better engage with pro se litigants. 
Family systems therapists and theorists have long studied the fact that the thera-
pist is not just learning about the family interactions and dynamics during a ses-
sion, but is also shaping them, too. When a therapist decides whom to provoke, 
whom to privilege, or whom to protect in each session, she is participating in the 
family dynamic.324 Talented therapists do this with intentionality to model differ-
ent choices in reactions, relationship alignments, or modalities of communication 
for the family to consider, but, as they do, they must be mindful to police and bal-
ance their choices so as to not distort or take over.325 Understanding this, a judge 
should understand that a family they see in the courtroom is not the very same 
family that exists outside of the courtroom; rather the family’s behavior in the 
courtroom and the choices they are making there are a reflection of, or dictated 
by, the nature of the proceedings and the judge’s role in administering those 
proceedings. 
319. See Croskerry et al., supra note 306, at 55; Stanovich et al., supra note 237, at 559; Stanovich & 
West, supra note 308, at 690. 
320. See Croskerry et al., supra note 306, at 55. 
321. KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATING DANGEROUSLY: THE FRONTIERS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
(2001). 
322. Nasie et al., supra note 220, at 1544. 
323. Croskerry et al., supra note 306, at 62-63. 
324. LYNN HOFFMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF FAMILY THERAPY (1981) (discussing the wisdom of Bateson, 
a forefather of family therapy, and his caution to “always keep in mind the entity whose stability is in 
question.”). 
325. Id. at 309 (discussing how to effect change in a family system through various therapeutic 
techniques which involves consideration of the “outrageous position that the therapist takes.”). 
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In addition to strengthening the litigation playbook inside the courtroom, advo-
cates might consider how to inspire reform outside of the context of an individual 
trial. In the criminal courts, where admittedly the progress is slow moving and 
still insufficient, there has at least been some change to better account for judicial 
bias. For example, impacted communities started organizing, and their advocacy 
campaigns garnered significant wins such as the adoption of court-watch pro-
grams and heightened public accounting and transparency about rates of dispar-
ity.326 
See, e.g., COURT WATCH MA, https://www.courtwatchma.org/ (stating its mission as a 
community project dedicated to shifting the power dynamics in courtrooms by exposing the decisions 
judges and prosecutors make about neighbors every day). 
Practitioners in immigration courts have also begun to ask questions about 
judicial bias.327 These inquiries are particularly apt to the family law setting 
because immigration proceedings, like family court proceedings, are presided 
over by a single adjudicator and are based on a highly discretionary standard.328 
Similar oversight and analysis of family court would be illuminating and 
powerful. 
CONCLUSION 
Paulette and Norman had equal access to their children before entering a court-
room. At the conclusion of a two-day and one-day trial, respectively, and without 
their matters—that is their lives and those of their children—having been taken 
under advisement, their access to those they loved was diminished considerably, 
most notably for Paulette. To be clear, their own decisions before, during, and af-
ter the trial, both in terms of their parenting and their plans for the litigation, 
played a part in the outcome. So too, of course, did the decisions of their counsel, 
one of whom authors this piece. But Paulette, Norman, their ex-spouses, and their 
counsel, were not alone in the room. Our decisions intersected with those of the 
bench, which is to say that our histories, stories, and beliefs collided with those of 
the bench. The consequences of the collision of lives lived—and the impressions 
those lives created—were most acutely felt by Paulette and Norman, and unfortu-
nately, are long lasting. 
In most courts, and certainly family courts, judges should strive to adjudicate 
in such a way that is mindful of their temporary role in a family. Their job is to 
collaborate with the parties to “bind up the social fabric” of the family that is in 
front of them, not fray the edges or create seams.329 Judges can better apply them-
selves to creating meaning and opportunity through law for varied people and 
families if they can hear the narrative of varied lives and can find value in the 
326.
327. Andrew I. Schoenholtz et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 295, 301-03 (2007). Interestingly and relatedly, there is a “clear bias” standard of review. See, 
e.g., Molina v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 1056, 1061 (2018) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 
(1994)). 
328. See I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002). 
329. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 27 
(1988). 
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lives described.330 In turn, judges will be better able to work with respectful curi-
osity and cultural humility, as well as to know and control their bias, if the train-
ing and support they receive, the procedures they are beholden to, and the 
litigators before them remind them that bias is there, and join them in an interest 
in controlling it.331 Failing that, there is a risk that fact finders will not hear unex-
pected voices, spurn the “other,” or replace foreign narratives with something 
less dissonant to their own assumptions.332 When this happens, judges are likely 
to discount the effort and love of those who mother at the margins of the domi-
nant frame, with detrimental outcomes for the litigants seeking their help.  
330. Lawrence, supra note 9, at 385 (further stating that the values expressed in the law are not 
culture free and judicial interpretation of those laws is “rooted” in their own culture.). 
331. See Croskerry et al., supra note 306, at 55; Stanovich et al., supra note 237, at 559. 
332. Azar & Benjet, supra note 2, at 251. 
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